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Issues and Recommendations 
Nord Stream 2 –  
A Political and Economic Contextualisation 
The plans to add another pair of pipes to the Nord 
Stream facility under the Baltic Sea have created 
waves within the European Union. While the Russian 
energy giant Gazprom and the project’s European 
supporters argue that Nord Stream 2 and its new 
direct connections between Russian gas fields and 
the EU energy markets will improve Europe’s energy 
security, the Commission and certain member states 
are sceptical. Their worries include further expansion 
of Gazprom’s dominant position in the EU markets 
and a weakening of the current transit countries, 
which could potentially completely lose their function 
of conveying Russian gas to central and western Europe. 
Above all in the eastern parts of the EU, there are also 
concerns that the project could negatively impact 
the region’s own security of supply and have political 
repercussions in the form of a revitalisation of Ger-
man-Russian cooperation, with European and foreign 
policy reverberations well beyond the energy sector. 
One major point to be emphasised is that setting 
the planning and construction process in motion on 
the basis of a commercial venture entails a clear and 
given application and permission procedure based 
on law and regulation. Nevertheless, the pipeline is a 
politically highly charged issue. Notwithstanding, the 
subsequent legal processes should not be intermingled 
with the political dimension. 
The intense debates over the pipeline project unfold 
in a multi-dimensional context. For the EU, the Nord 
Stream 2 discussion raises the question whether – 
assuming the pipeline is built – it will be able to pass 
a three-fold consistency and coherence test: firstly in 
connection with the rules for the internal energy mar-
ket, which should be neither watered down nor bent 
for political reasons; secondly in terms of its foreign 
policy and security objectives, concretely towards 
Ukraine, which should not be undermined by energy 
policy decisions; and thirdly, in relation to its internal 
cohesion, which Nord Stream 2 could erode: politically 
if the rifts between member states over policy on 
Russia and energy widen, and economically because 
the pipeline project could lead member states to con-
centrate more strongly on national energy policy and 
above all energy security policy, thus exacerbating 
market fragmentation. 
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On the one hand, Nord Stream 2 could serve to 
restore space and prospects for shared interests after 
the dramatic worsening of EU-Russia relations caused 
by the crisis over Ukraine in 2014. On the other, one 
cannot ignore the geopolitical dimensions of the proj-
ect, which is designed to obviate the need for transit 
through Ukraine. Moreover, the idea of building an-
other pipeline through the Baltic is a political live 
wire. Opponents argue that the project makes a 
mockery of the Energy Union and contradicts all its 
objectives. So the pipeline plan involves significant 
political costs whether it fails or succeeds. Nord Stream 
is a commercial venture, but its impacts transcend 
its commercial and energy implications. Without a 
question, the project represents a challenge for energy 
diplomacy both internal and external. 
While the German government rightly emphasises 
the project’s commercial character, it has also backed 
it for reasons of gas supply security. Germany is the 
landfall state in terms of existing law and regulation. 
From a German perspective it is particularly impor-
tant to argue the benefits for the European gas market 
as a whole and to dispel myths. Concerns that a bi-
lateral monopoly could emerge are unfounded, as 
the German gas market is fully liberalised with open 
competition. Germany must foster confidence (among 
its neighbours) in its competition authorities and 
scrupulously monitor shifts in markets and market 
power. At the same time, the potential costs for Euro-
pean and bilateral relations must be closely observed 
and where possible reduced. To that end Germany 
could conduct a structured multilateral energy dia-
logue with its central eastern European neighbours, 
with the aim of reconciling the different interests in 
the process of developing the Energy Union. The sym-
bolic nature of the project should not be stacked any 
higher, but its political implications reflected and 
accommodated in the Energy Union framework, in 
order to avoid rifts with EU partners. 
Additionally, the aforementioned potentially 
divisive effects of the Nord Stream 2 project should 
be reduced and inconsistencies avoided: 
 The onshore connecting pipelines for Nord Stream 
are subject to regulation under EU law. But the 
offshore sections are currently a grey area, to the 
extent that Germany, the EU and Russia disagree 
over which “regime” to apply. That also opens up 
opportunities for a broader settlement of conten-
tious bilateral issues. The “Gazprom-sceptical” EU 
member states will certainly subject any compro-
mise granting concessions to Gazprom to close 
scrutiny, even if it were framed as a “Nord Stream 2 
exit deal”. They would also revise their to date largely 
positive perception of the role of the European 
Commission. 
 If Nord Stream 2 does not come into operation as 
planned, the problem of east-west transit and the 
question of the security and reliability of the Ukrain-
ian transport corridor remains pressing. The resusci-
tation of TurkStream also has implications for tran-
sit volumes. A reconciliation of interests between 
the EU and Russia should be trilateral, including 
Ukraine, and be negotiated with the participation 
of the affected member states. A compromise 
should be sought that permits Russia and north-
western Europe to expand their direct gas links 
through the Baltic, but at the same time preserves 
transit of a defined gas volume through Ukraine 
as a flexibility option. Only on the basis of such a 
minimum consensus can an attractive business 
model for the Ukrainian transit corridor be found. 
In any case the EU and its member states should 
continue their efforts to encourage stabilisation 
in Ukraine’s energy policy and supply (above and 
beyond the gas sector) in the scope of the Energy 
Community. 
 The argument that Nord Stream 2 will divide the 
markets is misleading, as the EU gas markets are 
already divided due to an uneven implementation 
of the third internal market package. The energy 
supply situation and market conditions in central 
eastern and south-eastern Europe need rapid mar-
ket reforms and improvement. Alongside full im-
plementation of the third internal market package, 
this would include calculating the consequences 
of possible changes in Russian gas routing for states 
in this region and supporting the affected countries 
in making the necessary adjustments to their trans-
port infrastructure. 
 None of the sides should have any interest in delay-
ing the approval and construction process, as that 
would only prolong the uncertainty. Russia is keep-
ing its options open with TurkStream (and South 
Stream). These imponderables create particular dif-
ficulties for network planning in central and south-
eastern Europe countries, whose energy systems are 
extremely vulnerable. 
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Nord Stream 2 – A Commercial Project with Political Dimensions 
 
The construction costs for adding two additional lines 
to the Nord Stream pipeline system – increasing total 
annual capacity by 55 billion cubic metres – are esti-
mated at €8 to 10 billion. Realising the pipeline is the 
explicit object of a project company set up in Septem-
ber 2015 in St Petersburg. Originally Gazprom, which 
is majority owned by the Russian state, was to hold 50 
percent of the shares of Nord Stream 2 AG, European 
partners the other 50 percent. The European support-
ers are Uniper (formerly E.On, Germany), BASF/Winter-
shall (Germany), OMV (Austria), Shell (Anglo-Dutch) 
and Engie (France). The Belgian transmission operator 
Fluxys is also open to becoming a Nord Stream 2 
shareholder.1 
The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will start in the Narva 
Bay in Russia (see map, p. 8).2 Its landfall lies south of 
Nord Stream 1’s, which was sited to connect the (as yet 
still undeveloped) Shtokman gas field in the Barents 
Sea. According to the project company, the two new 
lines will connect the Russian Bovanenkovo gas field 
on the Yamal Peninsula – which is already on stream 
with an annual production capacity of 115 billion 
cubic metres – to the European gas market. But off-
shore, from the outer limit of Russia’s exclusive eco-
nomic zone, the new pipeline is to follow the same 
course as Nord Stream 1, which came on stream in 
2011 and 2012. The Nord Stream 1 pipes are laid 
in parallel, roughly 150 metres apart for reasons of 
safety. They pass through the exclusive economic 
zones of Finland, Sweden and Denmark (and the 
coastal waters of the Danish island of Bornholm) 
as well as Germany’s exclusive economic zone and 
coastal waters, before ending at Lubmin close to 
Greifswald. The Nord Stream 2 project is proceeding 
with pipes and concrete weight coating ordered, 
logistics and pipelaying contracts awarded. 
 
1 “Fluxys Prepared to Become Nord Stream 2 Shareholder”, 
Interfax, 26 January 2017, http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/ 
article/23713/fluxys-prepared-to-become-nord-stream-2-
shareholder (accessed 21 February 2017). 
2 See map on Nord Stream 2 website, https://www.nord-
stream2.com/media/documents/pdf/en/2017/01/nsp2_karte-
2d_rgb_baltic_nsp1-nsp2_en_2017_01_04.pdf (accessed 
21 February 2017). 
To comprehend the European dimensions of the 
project, one must trace the long routes followed by 
Russian gas into the EU. It is no accident that OMV, 
Shell and Engie have joined Uniper and Wintershall in 
backing the project. Currently, gas from Nord Stream 1 
arrives in Greifswald and is transported west through 
the NEL pipeline (Nordeuropäische Erdgasleitung) and 
south to the Czech border via the OPAL pipeline (Ost-
see-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung). In order to cope with 
the entire volume supplied by Nord Stream 1 and 2 and 
transport the gas to neighbouring countries to the west, 
south and east, the existing connecting pipelines will 
have to be used to the full, and new capacity created. 
From the present perspective, it would seem almost 
impossible to classify Nord Stream 2 as “neutral” or 
“objective” in terms of energy policy and supply. Al-
though treated in Germany especially as a commercial 
project of obvious economic rationality, with reference 
to its legal framework and private-sector investors, 
Germany’s neighbours in the east and the European 
Commission in Brussels regard it as political and 
potentially divisive. As far as its opponents are con-
cerned, the timing of the Nord Stream 2 project could 
hardly be worse, because it contradicts the goals of the 
EU Energy Union, aids Russia’s foreign policy and eco-
nomic course, and further destabilises Ukraine. Even if 
the venture is assessed under the criteria of the three 
central objectives of EU energy policy (security of sup-
ply, competitiveness and sustainability, the “energy 
triangle”), the level of disagreement appears so large 
as to preclude opportunities for compromise and 
reconciliation within the Union. Assessments of the 
pipeline’s impact on the European energy system also 
vary enormously widely depending on the timeframe. 
Aside frosm the outlined conflicts in energy policy, 
the Nord Stream 2 project also touches on another 
sore point in the European Union: the open disagree-
ment within the EU-28 over where future relations 
with Russia – including energy relations – should be 
heading. The same applies to the trilateral relation-
ship with Russia and Ukraine. While Brussels officially 
proclaims solidarity with Ukraine, concrete political 
measures are dictated by short-term crisis manage-
ment. Moreover, a degree of disillusionment is detect-
able within the Union. 
Nord Stream 2 – A Commercial Project with Political Dimensions 
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Map 
Major gas pipelines in Europe 
 
To reduce Nord Stream 2 to a commercial project 
would be to ignore its repercussions. Yet, acknowledg-
ing the importance of the the legal and regulatory, 
economic and political aspects should not lead to an 
intermingling of all the dimensions. The business 
aspects form the basis of the project and as such are 
the subject of the first chapter. Chapter 2 describes 
the legal and regulatory framework within which the 
project operates. Regulation is the Commission’s deci-
sive leverage for shaping a competitive and integrated 
European gas market. Partly in response to Gazprom’s 
activities, regulatory arrangements have been devel-
oped further since 2009. Gazprom’s market position 
and the repercussions on the gas markets in north-
western Europe, in Germany and in central and south-
eastern Europe are addressed in Chapter 3 (“Market 
Trends, Market (Power) Relations and Security of 
Supply”, pp. 19 ff.). Since the annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and the fighting in eastern Ukraine, energy trade 
with Russia has come under closer qualitative political 
scrutiny in the EU. It is also in this context that the 
concept of an EU Energy Union was developed as one 
of the ten priorities of the Juncker Commission. Nord 
Stream 2 is attributed significant potential to sow 
division within the EU-28 and the Energy Union. The 
project’s political costs are high and the harm to rela-
tions with Germany’s immediate eastern “gas neigh-
bours” significant. But failure or massive delays could 
multiply the existing problems in energy relations 
with Russia. These foreign policy and geopolitical im-
plications are examined in Chapter 4 (“Nord Stream 2 
– The Political Dimension”, pp. 26 ff.). The concluding 
chapter affirms the thesis that while planning and 
construction is a matter for Gazprom and its Euro-
pean partners, it is up to Germany and the EU to ad-
dress the repercussions. How, in turn, the EU assesses 
and responds to the Nord Stream 2 venture touches 
on fundamental principles of EU integration and may 
have broader implications. 
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Nord Stream 2 as a Business Project 
 
The commercial logic of Nord Stream 2 AG 
from the Western business perspective 
After the Polish competition authority raised objec-
tions to the Swiss-incorporated company in August 
2016, Gazprom is now the sole owner of Nord Stream 
2 AG, registered in Zug, Switzerland. Originally Uni-
per, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Engie and Shell each 
wanted to take 10 percent. The risks of such an invest-
ment would have been calculable: the capacity is 
booked by Gazprom and the return is fixed. So rev-
enue and return on investment were predictable. Such 
conditions are obviously also attractive for lenders like 
banks and insurance companies. But consortium was 
subject to merger controls in both Germany and in 
Poland, where effects on the respective markets were 
to be expected. While the German Federal Cartel Office 
announced its approval in December 2015, the Polish 
competition authority sent the consortium a list of 
questions. The firms responded by withdrawing their 
application. It remains to be seen what kind of sub-
stitute arrangements (if at all) the western European 
firms find for their cooperation with Gazprom (con-
vertible bonds were a first option, loans are reportedly 
under discussion). It has proven difficult to find a 
form that is similarly transparent and creates a bal-
ance of risk and control, but cannot be interpreted as 
simply bypassing the Polish merger control process. 
The western European firms – Uniper (formerly 
E.On), BASF/Wintershall, OMV, Shell and Engie – 
would like to see their partnership with Gazprom 
expanded through the pipeline construction, espe-
cially given that their supply contracts with the Rus-
sian energy giant extend for decades to come. In view 
of the complex current market situation, character-
ised by declining production within the EU, depressed 
gas prices and a difficult business environment in 
Russia, they are interested in strengthening their mar-
ket positions as suppliers, energy traders and/or gas 
producers, and safeguarding their investments in 
Russia. This strategy also reflects a very pragmatic 
attitude towards economic realities: in the short and 
medium term (until after 2020) Gazprom is in a posi-
tion to supply gas to the EU in flexible quantities at 
competitive prices.3 
If the western European firms had been able to join 
the consortium, this would have created considerable 
advantages from the EU perspective, as their partici-
pation would have enhanced transparency and con-
trol in the project. In purely economic terms, it is 
remarkable that no public funding is required on the 
western side. The creation of a joint stock company 
to realise a private-sector infrastructure project would 
have dovetailed with the ideal of free-market competi-
tion and created new import capacities. Now Gazprom 
is the sole shareholder. While this does not necessarily 
erase the considerations and effects outlined above, 
it certainly represents something of a qualitative shift. 
If Gazprom does now build and operate the pipeline 
on its own, this will be the first direct gas pipeline 
connection to the European market under its exclu-
sive control. 
Gazprom’s calculation 
Since 2014 Russia has made it abundantly clear that it 
is seeking alternative export routes, in order to avoid 
or minimise gas transport through Ukraine, which it 
now regards as an unacceptable risk. For the Russians, 
this is the main reason to build Nord Stream 2. At the 
height of the crisis over Ukraine in 2014 the Kremlin 
and Gazprom headquarters both called for a complete 
end to Ukrainian transit.4 During the following year, 
2015, the position was somewhat relativised, with Gaz-
prom now intimating that it had been told to negotiate 
post-2019 transit terms with Ukraine. 
 
3 Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, Russian Gas Transit across 
Ukraine Post-2019: Pipeline Scenarios, Gas Flow Consequences, and 
Regulatory Constraints, OIES Paper NG 105 (Oxford: Oxford Insti-
tute for Energy Studies [OIES], February 2016), 7. 
4 “Miller: Rol’ Ukrainy’ v kachestve transitera svedetsya k 
nulyu” [Miller: Ukraine’s role in transit will fall to zero], 
Vzglyad, 6 December 2014, http://vz.ru/news/2014/12/6/ 
719045.html (accessed 19 December 2014). 
Nord Stream 2 as a Business Project 
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Figure 1 
Russian gas transport capacities and exports to the EU, 2010–2015 (billion cubic metres per annum) 
Source: “Gas Trade Flows in Europe, in Mcm”, International Energy Agency (IEA) website, 2016, http://www.iea.org/gtf/index.asp 
(accessed 2 December 2016); IEA, Gas: Medium Term Market Report 2015: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2020 (Paris, 2015), 106. 
 
The West asserts that Moscow has geopolitical motives 
for constructing new pipelines in the Baltic, concretely 
that they are linked to efforts to bypass and weaken 
Ukraine.5 Indeed, in the case of the Nord Stream 2 
project, there is much to suggest that Russia’s eco-
nomic and political interests coincide. After all, the 
Russian state owns more than half of Gazprom. But 
Nord Stream 2 is just one of several pipelines to Europe 
and Asia brought into play by Gazprom in 2014/15. In 
a fluid geopolitical situation, the Kremlin wishes to 
preserve as many economic and political options as 
possible. Facing pressure in all its traditional markets, 
Gazprom is forced to experiment with new marketing 
strategies and develop new sales channels. Moreover, 
from Moscow’s perspective the Nord Stream 2 project 
and its support by Western companies demonstrates 
that – despite international sanctions – Russia is not 
isolated and remains an attractive economic partner. 
Beyond the geopolitical aspects there are also identi-
fiable geoeconomic reasons to avoid transit through 
Ukraine. In general terms, a modern, efficient and 
direct connection to the market reduces (transit) risks, 
given that transit status tempts states to leverage their 
transport monopoly to maximise rents. Since the late 
1990s, and especially since the early 2000s, Russia 
has worked to diversify export routes and reduce the 
 
5 This view was explicitly expressed by the Obama adminis-
tration. The position of US President Trump and his new 
administration was not yet clear at the time of writing (as 
of February 2017). 
volume of gas transited through Ukraine. The Yamal-
Europe pipeline and Nord Stream 1 have already done 
a great deal to curb the volume of gas transported 
through Ukraine (see Figure 1 above). 
Expanding the Baltic connection will allow Gaz-
prom to supply its largest market, Germany, directly, 
expand to deliveries, and to reduce the transit risks to 
other major customers (including France). The Euro-
pean and global gas markets have undergone a funda-
mental transformation since 2009/10. Considerably 
more than half the natural gas traded today is tied to 
hub prices. Gas prices have fallen and are converging 
across the north-west European markets, with only 
small price differences remaining. In this new market 
situation, Gazprom has successively adapted its price 
strategy and granted retroactive discounts to many of 
its north-west European customers. It has also auctioned 
gas in Germany and the Baltic states. Nonetheless, Gaz-
prom’s business relations are still largely based on 
long-term take-or-pay contracts. Gazprom has to main-
tain the gas fields it requires to supply the volumes 
ordered by its customers in the EU. 
Gazprom’s long-term contracts with European 
firms extend long beyond 2019. They oblige Gazprom 
to supply specific volumes in specific periods, and in 
return guarantee stable sales volumes past 2030. From 
Gazprom’s perspective, Germany is an extremely good 
choice as the hub for its westward gas exports. Germany 
is the EU’s largest gas market and also the largest 
purchaser of Russian gas, with long-term contracts ex-
tending until 2034. And Gazprom has a strong pres-
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ence along the entire German supply chain. Proximity 
to the German and European markets and access to 
major storage capacities grants Gazprom every oppor-
tunity not only to fulfil its long-term contracts, but 
also to pursue a volume-driven strategy in response to 
a changing (and at the wishes of the EU more strongly 
spot market-driven) EU gas market. In a saturated gas 
market the incentives for other companies to invest in 
alternative projects may fall. Gazprom possesses great 
flexibility in its marketing strategies (even more so 
with an additional pipeline through the Baltic Sea), 
a flexibility that used to lie on the European side.6 In 
other words, Gazprom could consolidate its market 
shares in the currently oversupplied gas market and 
(at least temporarily) defend them against competi-
tors. Such an optimisation of its own market position 
and price strategy would be economically rational. 
Here it is up to the German competition authorities 
to monitor the relevant market activities. 
From the Russian perspective, the transit risks 
associated with the Ukrainian route are not going 
away. The Ukrainian pipeline system has been neither 
modernised nor overhauled for decades, and it must 
be assumed that de facto westward transit capacity 
is now no more than 90–95 billion cubic metres 
annually.7 
For the past quarter-century since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Ukrainian-Russian gas relations have 
been characterised by a process of continued bargain-
ing of political and economic concessions (for example 
retention of the Russian Black Sea naval base in return 
for gas price discounts). Transit revenues and access to 
cheap gas from the east bred corruption and hindered 
reforms in Ukraine (and on the Russian side too). 
Attempts to place gas trade and transit on a new con-
tractual basis in 2009 did not really put an end to 
these quid-pro-quo deals, and disputes over gas pricing 
and Ukrainian debts exploded again in June 2014 in 
the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea and 
 
6 Thierry Bros, Has Ukraine Scored an Own-goal with Its Transit Fee 
Proposal? Oxford Energy Comment (Oxford: OIES, November 
2016), 5, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/11/Has-Ukraine-scored-an-own-goal-with-its-
transit-fee-proposal.pdf. 
7 Andreas Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2: Regulation, Geo-
politics and Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe and the 
UK, Strategy Paper 10 (London: European Centre for Energy 
and Resource Security [EUCERS], 2016), 18, and Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER), Annual Report on the 
Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets 
in 2014 (Ljubljana and Brussels, November 2015), 258. 
military destabilisation of eastern Ukraine.8 The spat 
supplied Gazprom and Russia with an excuse to seek 
new supply routes, not least in order to fulfil the long-
term supply contracts with European customers. 
From the commercial perspective, it is significant 
that the current transit contract expires in 2019. But 
there is uncertainty over transport charges and transit 
terms both before and after that date (see “Transit 
through Ukraine”, p. 20). 
The imponderables associated with gas transit 
through Ukraine have thus grown, because the legal, 
economic and technical context is and will remain 
complicated (see below, pp. 20 f.). Ultimately, the 
Ukrainian discussions about new and much higher 
gas transport tariffs boost the apparent economic 
benefits of Nord Stream 2.9 The transportation tariffs 
for Nord Stream 2 lie about 20 percent below the cur-
rent charges for the Ukrainian corridor.10 
 
8 ACER and CEER, Annual Report (see note 7), 262. 
9 Where the old transit contract set a price of approximately 
$2.70 per thousand cubic metres per hundred kilometres, 
the cost to Gazprom is set to almost double when the non-
regulated (volume-based) transit contract is superseded by 
a regulated contract with capacity booking, see Bros, Has 
Ukraine Scored an Own-goal (see note 6), 3/4. 
10 Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2 (see note 7), 19. 
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Nord Stream 2 and Regulation in the EU’s Internal Market 
 
The legal framework in the internal market 
Even while a Russian-European consortium was still 
on the cards, Nord Stream 2 faced a difficult political 
environment and unclear regulatory situation in 
the European Union. The pipeline runs counter to the 
political objectives of Brussels and many member 
states, whose declared goal is to diversify gas sources 
and reduce dependency on imports from Russia 
(especially where this creates vulnerability). This long-
term interest was also central to the design of the 
Energy Union. The political concerns are addressed 
in a later chapter (see below, pp. 26 ff.) The discussion 
here concentrates on the legal and regulatory frame-
work, because internal market regulation has proven 
the most effective instrument for Brussels to pursue 
energy policy objectives.11 For this reason, the Com-
mission has also conducted an examination of the 
legal framework. 
In order to understand the legal and regulatory 
discussions, one must remember that power over 
energy policy is shared between the Union and the 
member states.12 While the latter possess national 
sovereignty over their energy mix, the Union estab-
lishes norms designed to ensure a functioning energy 
market and security of supply through the legislative 
procedure. As far as the operation of gas pipelines is 
concerned, Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks 
and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas are particularly 
significant. Both are part of the third internal market 
package. Under Directive 2009/73/EC, vertically inte-
grated gas suppliers must relinquish their transmis-
sion systems, thus separating the latter from produc-
tion, import and distribution (Article 15). Implement-
 
11 Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, “Soft Power with a 
Hard Edge: EU Policy Tools and Energy Security”, Review of 
International Political Economy 22, no. 5 (2015): 941–65; Kirsten 
Westphal, “Gazprom und die EU-Regeln des Binnenmarktes – 
auch eine politische Frage”, Russland-Analysen, no. 305 (20 No-
vember 2015): 2–5. 
12 See also Deutscher Bundestag, Unterabteilung Europa, 
Fachbereich Europa, Ausarbeitung: Nord Stream 2 – Vorgaben des 
europäischen Energierechts, PE 6-3000-27/16 (March 2016). 
ing the unbundling requirements and certifying inde-
pendent pipeline operators is the responsibility of the 
member states and the respective national regulator.13 
In the case of certification of pipeline operators, the 
Commission provides only an opinion on the certifi-
cation procedure. Third-party access to pipelines (Arti-
cle 13) is regulated through so-called network codes 
governing allocation of transport capacities, modali-
ties for cross-border operations, and procedures for 
setting tariffs and congestion management. The net-
work codes are prepared by the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) on 
the basis of the framework guidelines of the Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), approved 
by the Commission and implemented by the national 
regulatory authorities. Long transitional periods are 
provided for transport capacities set in pre-existing 
long-term contracts, and the network code for capac-
ity allocation, which came into effect on 1 November 
2015, permits large capacities to be booked up to fif-
teen years in advance. On these aspects the EU made 
concessions to gas exporters like Gazprom. The Com-
mission also permitted exceptions for major infra-
structure projects (interconnectors, LNG terminals; 
storage), to which third parties can be denied access in 
certain cases. Exemptions may be granted by national 
regulators in the interests of competition and security 
of supply, but must also be confirmed by the Commis-
sion. These internal market rules thus define the 
respective radius of action enjoyed by Brussels and the 
member states. 
Nord Stream 2 – Legal approaches and 
contested issues 
All these aforementioned aspects play an important 
role in the question of how rapidly and under what 
regulatory and legal terms Nord Stream 2 could be 
realised. 
The Nord Stream 2 consortium has chosen to pur-
sue the same realisation path as was taken for Nord 
 
13 Ibid., 7. 
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13 
Stream 1.14 Since the planning phase for Nord Stream 
1, however, the political and legal circumstances in 
the EU have changed. The construction of the first 
trans-Baltic pipeline was decided in 2005 and begun 
in 2010. The twin lines came on stream in 2011 and 
2012.15 There was no formal inter-governmental agree-
ment between Germany and Russia for Nord Stream 
1.16 In September 2005 then German Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder and Russian President Vladimir Putin 
merely signed a declaration of intent. Nor was there 
any formal agreement between the EU and Russia, 
even though the project was originally supposed to 
have a pan-European dimension and was planned as 
part of the Trans-European Networks. At the time it 
was intended to connect the major Shtokman field 
to the European grid. 
The preparatory work on the Nord Stream 2 project 
has started. This implies a formal process of applica-
tion and assessment under national legislation, EU 
law and international conventions.17 The planning 
and construction process is conducted under the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Espoo Convention, 
established under the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe. In line with UNCLOS, which stipu-
lates the freedom to lay submarine pipelines, but 
requires state consent for the exact route where they 
pass through exclusive economic zones and/or terri-
torial waters. Nord Stream 2 passes through the 
territorial waters and/or exclusive economic zones of 
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. In 
 
14 Karel Beckman, “Can Nord Stream 2 Be Stopped?”, Energy 
Post (online), 14 April 2016, http://www.energypost.eu/can-nord-
stream-2-stopped/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
15 For a very detailed description of the process, see Nord 
Stream, Sichere Energie für Europa. Das Nord Stream-Pipelineprojekt 
2005–2012 (Zug, July 2013), http://www.nord-stream.com/ 
media/documents/pdf/de/2014/04/sichere-energie-fur-europa-
komplette-fassung_245_20140417.pdf (accessed 8 September 
2016). 
16 Normally an IGA between the exporting country and the 
landfall state would clarify the most important questions: 
environmental protection, regulatory responsibility, liability. 
It would also specify matters such as force majeure, transpar-
ency and technical maintenance, see Philipp Offenberg, The 
European Neighbourhood and the EU’s Security of Supply with Natu-
ral Gas, Policy Paper 156 (Berlin: Jacques Delors Institut, 
15 January 2016), 17, http://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/20160115_EUNeighbourhoodAnd 
Gas-Offenberg-JDIB-Jan161.pdf (accessed 1 February 2016). 
17 See also Ulrich Lissek, Regulation of Nord Stream 2: Rule of 
Law, Equal Treatment and Due Process: A View from the Project Devel-
oper, CEPS Commentary, 15 November 2016. 
this countries Nord Stream 2 must apply for various 
consents to the construction and operation of the 
pipeline under national law. The Espoo Convention 
has the objective to reduce cross-border environmen-
tal impacts. This includes exchange of information 
and cooperation between neighbouring states, such as 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Although Russia 
has not ratified the Espoo Convention it is committed 
to complying with the provisions again, as it did in 
the case of Nord Stream 1. By January 2017, Sweden 
had received a formal application based on these inter-
national conventions, which it will have to assess 
accordingly. Nord Stream 2 can be expected to apply 
to the other states very soon too. In Germany as the 
landfall state, the Mining Authority (Bergamt) in Stral-
sund and the Federal Authority for Maritime Naviga-
tion and Hydrography (Bundesamt für Seeschiffahrt 
und Hydrographie) conduct the necessary investiga-
tions. An environmental impact assessment based on 
the EU EIA Directive will also be part of the licensing 
process. Given that this process of application, assess-
ment and rejection/permission is based on a clear 
sequence of procedural steps, and given that the appli-
cation for Nord Stream 1 passed in all states, it would 
require a sound legal argumentation to reject the 
application this time around. 
This is why opponents look to the Third Energy 
Market Package and its applicability.18 Where offshore 
pipelines begin outside the EU but pass through the 
exclusive economic zones and coastal waters of EU 
member states, room exists for various legal interpre-
tations. The crucial question is whether the Third 
Energy Market Package applies to the pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea. If EU law applies offshore (which poses 
technical difficulties) the pipeline’s categorisation 
would be decisive for the application of EU rules.19 
Under Article 34 of Directive 2009/73/EC upstream 
pipelines are excluded from the internal market 
package, and are regulated by the landfall state. On 
the basis of that interpretation, German Economy 
Minister Sigmar Gabriel declared that Germany was 
seeking to retain regulation of Nord Stream 2 under 
the remit of its national authorities, when he visited 
 
 
18 For greater detail see Kim Talus, “Application of EU 
Energy and Certain National Laws of Baltic Sea Countries to 
the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Project”, Journal of World Energy 
Law and Business 10, no. 1 (2017): 30–42. 
19 In that case third-party access would theoretically have 
to be offered at some point (in the coastal waters, in the ex-
clusive economic zone or in Russia). 
Nord Stream 2 and Regulation in the EU’s Internal Market 
SWP Berlin 
Nord Stream 2 
March 2017 
 
 
 
14 
Pipelines and EU energy law 
Since the announcement of plans to build a second 
pair of pipelines under the Baltic, the EU has de-
bated whether an offshore pipeline that passes 
through the coastal waters (and the exclusive eco-
nomic zone) of one or more member states is sub-
ject to regulation under the third internal market 
package. If it was, the relevant rules would apply, 
including the unbundling requirement for 
transmission system operators. But first it would 
have to be considered whether Nord Stream 2 was 
an upstream pipeline or a transmission system. 
Upstream pipelines are treated as part of the gas 
production process, transporting gas to other 
production-related facilities (treatment plant or 
terminal). They end where saleable gas is fed into 
the transmission system.a Upstream pipelines are 
regulated by the national agency of the landfall 
state.b In that sense, Nord Stream is not an up-
stream pipeline as it connects the Russian gas 
transmission system with the German one.c Under 
the wording of the EU energy acquis Nord Stream 
2 cannot be categorised as an interconnector or cross-
border interconnection between EU member states 
either, even though it is an interconnector from a 
technical perspective.d EU law makes no provision 
for a pipeline transporting gas between two mar-
kets with different regulatory regimes.e 
a Deutscher Bundestag, Ausarbeitung: Nord Stream 2 
(see note 12), 7. 
b Offenberg, The European Neighbourhood (see note 16),  
17–19); Catherine Banet, Access to Upstream Infrastructures: 
The Regulation of Third Party Access (University of Ohio, 
JUS5410 – Petroleum Law, 26 February 2012). 
c See also Talus, “Application of EU Energy and Certain 
National Laws” (see note 18), 35. 
d Ibid. 
e Talus even argues that “(t)he fact that external pipelines 
connecting with the transmission system of the EU at the 
external borders are not covered by this framework indi-
cates that the legislator did not intend to include these 
pipelines into the scope of the EU energy acquis. [This…] is 
also visible in the CAM code (Capacity Allocation Manage-
ment), which specifically notes that the entry-exit-regime 
will not be applicable to such connections with third 
countries.” Talus, “Application of EU Energy and Certain 
National Laws” (see note 18), 49. 
 
EU regulation and Gazprom’s engagement in the 
EU gas market 
Since 2009 at the latest, the EU’s paradigm of 
creating a functioning and competitive internal 
market has included the politically motivated goal 
of geographically diversifying sources of energy 
imports – driven by deteriorating relations with 
Russia. Unlike Norway and Algeria, whose export 
pipelines generally make landfall in their main 
market, Gazprom is forced to transport its gas 
through several countries in order to reach cus-
tomers in countries like Germany. The EU’s politi-
cal perception of supply relations with Russia 
changed in the course of its eastern enlargement 
in the mid-2000s, when the new member states 
brought the legacy of their former dependency on 
Moscow into the Union. And the gas transit crises 
of 2006 and 2009 cast a sharp light on the en-
larged EU gas market’s dependency on Russian 
supplies. In this way the discussion about the con-
crete shape of the third internal market package 
and the implementation of unbundling was strong-
ly influenced by Gazprom’s actions. With an eye to 
the Russian monopolist, the Commission sought 
to restrict the acquisition of transport infrastruc-
ture by companies from third states to those that 
granted the same right reciprocally. While this so-
called “Gazprom clause” was ultimately dropped, 
the package did require that investments from 
third states be reviewed by the relevant national 
competition authority and confirmed by the Com-
mission. 
 
Moscow in October 2015.20 Many observers misunder-
stood this statement as a rejection of the Energy Union. 
After Nord Stream 2 was announced in 2015, lively 
discussion over legal interpretations ensued in the EU, 
with stiff resistance to the project, and consequently a 
search for regulatory leverage, not only among certain 
member states but also within the Commission and 
the Parliament (see text box “Pipelines and EU energy 
 
20 “Sostojalas vstrecha Vladimira Putina c vize-kanzlerom, 
ministrom ekonomiki i energetiki Federativnoj Respubliki 
Germanija Sigmarom Gabrielem” [Meeting between Vladimir 
Putin and Sigmar Gabriel, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for 
Economic Affairs and Energy of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many], 28 October 2015, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/50582 (accessed 29 October 2015). 
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South Stream 
  
South Stream was the project of a Gazprom-led 
consortium including BASF Wintershall (Germany), 
Eni (Italy) and EdF (France). The proposal was for a 
pipeline with an annual capacity of 63 billion cubic 
metres through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and on to 
Austria and Italy, partly offshore, partly onshore. 
An initial agreement was concluded in February 
2009. The third internal market package came into 
force in August that year, with far-reaching reper-
cussions for South Stream. After failing to obtain an 
unconditional exemption for the OPAL pipeline – 
and therefore being able to use only half its capac-
ity until October 2016 – Gazprom decided not to 
apply for an exemption for the onshore section of 
South Stream at all. Instead Russia concluded inter-
governmental agreements with the relevant EU 
member states. Moscow based its arguments on a 
position that international agreements carry greater 
force than the third internal market package. At 
the same time, in April 2014, it lodged a complaint 
with the World Trade Organisation.a 
a World Trade Organisation (WTO), Dispute Settlement, 
Dispute DS476: European Union and Its Member States – Certain 
Measures Relating to the Energy Sector. Request for Consultation by 
the Russian Federation (8 May 2015), http://bit.ly/2fgfYqd 
(accessed 2 December 2016). 
 The Commission, on the other hand, regarded 
the inter-governmental agreements as a breach of 
the terms of the third internal market package and 
demanded that the affected member states termi-
nate or renegotiate them. Otherwise it threatened 
infringement proceedings. Eventually the Commis-
sion did open two cases against Bulgaria, including 
for violating the third internal market package. Bul-
garia stopped construction work on the pipeline in 
August 2014. 
In this way, Brussels raised the bar to realisation 
of the South Stream pipeline ever higher. Its 
expansion of the rules of the third internal market 
package to South Stream is not uncontroversial, 
because the associated regulations and network 
codes did not in fact include clear rules (for 
example for identification, allocation and tariff 
setting) for incremental and new infrastructure. 
In relation to South Stream, the Commission 
argued in the spirit of its internal market package, 
but found itself on shaky legal ground. It is no 
secret that the project was already unpopular in 
Brussels, because it competed with the “southern 
corridor” preferred by the Commission. In the wake 
of the Crimea crisis, all the stops were pulled out to 
terminate the project for political reasons. 
 
 
law”).21 In fact, there is simply a legal grey zone con-
cerning transmission pipelines connecting a market 
outside the EU with the EU market. 
Drawing on the legal framework for existing pipe-
lines is problematic.22 So altogether there is no regu-
latory regime for Nord Stream 2 that is recognised by 
all sides. This opens room for an international agree-
ment between the EU and Russia. Yet, because the 
project is being realised in a highly charged environ-
 
21 Deutscher Bundestag, Ausarbeitung: Nord Stream 2 
(see note 12), 6. 
22 The four pipelines from North Africa to Spain and France 
are neither unbundled nor do they provide third-party access. 
They can be seen as upstream pipelines (producer pipelines), 
because they connect gas fields to the European network. On 
the other hand, pipelines from Norway, as a member of the 
European Economic Area, are subject to the regulations of 
the internal market (see Catherine Banet, Access to Upstream 
Infrastructures: The Regulation of Third Party Access [University of 
Ohio, JUS5410 – Petroleum Law, 26 February 2012]). 
ment, it is evident that its opponents will use all avail-
able levers, including EU regulations, to impede and 
delay construction. Gas relations between the EU and 
Russia have taken a significant turn for the worse 
since the construction of Nord Stream 1 and the sup-
ply and transit disruptions in Ukraine (see text box 
“EU regulation and Gazprom’s engagement in the EU 
gas market”). Conflicts between Russia and the EU have 
flared largely in connection with two pipelines: South 
Stream (see text box “South Stream”) and OPAL, the 
connecting pipeline for Nord Stream 1. Poland’s legal 
action against the European Commission’s OPAL ex-
emption decision exemplifies the politically charged 
environment (see the next chapter on connecting 
pipelines). 
Brussels has not yet made an official statement 
on its legal assessment of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 
Sweden and Denmark urged the Commission at the 
end of January 2017 to provide clarity on the impli-
cations of EU legislation and of the objectives of the 
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OPAL 
  
The OPAL pipeline was built exclusively to trans-
port gas from Nord Stream 1. The consortium 
therefore applied at an early stage for an exemption 
for sole use of the pipeline.a Although provision of 
non-discriminatory access for third parties is a 
requirement of the third internal market package, 
Gazprom remains (to date) the only importer of 
natural gas in Greifswald. 
An exemption granted by the German regulator 
Bundesnetzagentur in 2009 was rejected by the 
Commission the same year on the grounds that 
while it would enhance security of gas supply, it 
would not improve competition.b The Commission 
suggested conducting a so-called gas release pro-
gramme, where Gazprom would have offered three 
billion cubic metres of natural gas for auction in 
Greifswald.c At that point Gazprom was unwilling 
to do so. On 31 October 2013 Gazprom, OPAL Gas-
transport and Bundesnetzagentur agreed a settle-
ment that would have allowed Gazprom to use 100 
percent of the transport capacity: 50 percent per-
manently assigned, the other 50 percent acquired 
at auction.d Although this solution was reached in 
the presence of the Commission, the latter’s approv-
al was not granted as expected in March 2014, but 
repeatedly postponed. 
The conflict in and over Ukraine plainly played 
a role here. In December 2014 Gazprom then with-
drew from the settlement. As a result transport via 
OPAL was limited to just 18 billion cubic metres per 
annum for several years. 
a For more detail see Katja Yafimava, The OPAL Exemption 
Decision: Past, Present, Future, OIES Paper NG 117 (January 
2017). For a critical view see Alan Riley, “OPAL Pipeline 
Exemption”, http://www.statecraft.org.uk/research/opal-
pipeline-exemption-implications-questionable-decision 
(accessed 28 February 2017). 
b Commission of the European Communities, Betreff: Ausnah-
megenehmigung der Bundesnetzagentur für die OPAL-Gasleitung ge-
mäß Art. 22 der Richtlinie 2003/55, K(2009) 4694, 12 June 2009, 9. 
c Ibid., 22. 
d “OPAL Gastransport muss geplante Jahresauktion ver-
schieben: Beteiligungsverfahren der EU-Kommission noch 
nicht abgeschlossen” (Kassel, 28 February 2014), OPAL 
Gastransport website, http://www.opal-gastransport.de/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/140224_OPAL_Mitteilung.pdf 
(accessed 8 September 2016). 
 In mid-May 2016 the Bundesnetzagentur agreed 
a new settlement with Gazprom and OPAL Gastrans-
port, based largely on the earlier agreement. But 
this time the notification procedure lay in the hands 
of the Commission. In the end Brussels approved 
the compromise with stricter conditions on 28 Oc-
tober 2016: 50 percent of the capacity remains 
completely exempt from network access and tariff 
regulation. Up to 20 percent of the capacity at exit 
point Brandov must be offered in short-term con-
tracts at Gaspool’s virtual trading point, where Gaz-
prom can bid at the base price. OPAL Gastransport 
must also apply for certification as an independent 
transmission operator. Under the exemption deci-
sion Gazprom can use at least 80 percent of OPAL’s 
capacity, or 28.8 billion cubic metres annually. If its 
bid at base price is accepted it can use the full 36 
billion cubic metres per annum (on a short-term 
basis). This exemption applies until 2033, after which 
EU regulation applies in full. The settlement agree-
ment was signed by all parties in November 2016. 
The European Commission’s exemption decision 
and the settlement agreement with the German 
Bundesnetzagentur received harsh criticism from 
eastern European countries, in particular Poland 
and Ukraine. The Polish company PGNiG Supply 
and Trading filed a complaint at the Court of Justice 
of the European Union on 4 December 2016.e On 27 
December 2016 the Court of Justice suspended the 
decision and requested detailed information from 
the parties. On 15 December 2016 PGNIG brought 
legal action before the German Higher Regional 
Court in Düsseldorf. In an interim decision of 30 
December 2016 the Higher Regional Court ruled 
to suspend the settlement agreement and further 
capacity auctions. Thus, only the capacity auctioned 
in December for January could be used by Gazprom. 
Accordingly, flows dropped to the old pre-December 
level at the beginning of February 2017.f 
e For documents see en.pgnig.pl/search-results? 
phrase=OPAL. 
f Bundesnetzagentur, “Antrag auf Freistellung von der 
Regulierung gemäß § 28a EnWG: Hier: Information Ver-
gleichvertrag ‘OPAL’”. https://www. bundesnetzagentur.de/ 
DE/Service-Funktionen/Beschlusskammern/1BK-Geschaefts 
zeichen-Datenbank/BK7-GZ/2008/2008_0001bis0999/2008_ 
001bis099/BK7-08-009_BKV/Veröffentlichung_Aktuelles. 
html (accessed 22 February 2017). 
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Energy Union. The legal opinion of Germany,23 which 
is central on account of its status as the landfall state, 
is not going to change, and is unaffected by the con-
sortium issue. 
The connecting pipelines for Nord Stream 2 
Nord Stream 2 will remain incomplete until the ques-
tion of how (and where) the Russian gas is transported 
onwards has been resolved. Onward transport capacity 
for the planned additional 55 billion cubic metres 
arriving annually from 2019 in Greifswald is as yet 
lacking. The following variants are conceivable for 
the onshore section in Germany: 
a) full utilisation of OPAL, 
b) construction or expansion of a pipeline within the 
regulated network planning process and 
c) construction of new capacities under the planned 
amendments on incremental capacity to the Net-
work Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms,24 
which is still in the comitology procedure. 
The Nord Stream 1 system has two offshore pipelines 
and two connecting pipelines in Germany. Nord 
Stream 1 has a technical capacity of 55 billion cubic 
metres annually, of which only 38 billion cubic metres 
were used in the past. 20 billion cubic metres annually 
were transported west through the NEL pipeline. OPAL 
is the onward connection from Nord Stream’s landfall 
at Lubmin via Olbernhau in Saxony to the Czech Re-
public. While the OPAL pipeline has a capacity of 36 
billion cubic metres, until October 2016 regulatory 
difficulties meant that Gazprom was only able to use 
50 percent. The settlement of 28 November 2016 per-
mitted Gazprom to use 80 percent of capacity,25 and 
under certain conditions to make temporary use of 
the remaining 20 percent (see text box OPAL).26 The 
 
23  At the beginning of March 2017, a letter was sent by the 
President of the Bundesnetzagentur to DG Energy arguing 
that EU gas market liberalisation rules do not apply to the 
offshore pipeline Nord Stream 2. Author’s archive. 
24 “Incremental capacity”, ACER website, http://www. acer. 
europa.eu/en/gas/framework guidelines_and_networkcodes/ 
pages/incremental-capacity.aspx (accessed 21 February 2017). 
25 Bundesnetzagentur, Antrag auf Freistellung von der Regulie-
rung gemäß § 28a EnWG: Hier: Information Vergleichsvertrag OPAL, 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Service-Funktionen/ 
Beschlusskammern/1BK-Geschaeftszeichen-Datenbank/BK7-
GZ/2008/2008_0001bis0999/2008_001bis099/BK7-08-009_BKV/ 
Veröffentlichung_Aktuelles.html (accessed 8 December 2016). 
26 European Commission, “Gas Markets: Commission Re-
inforces Market Conditions in Revised Exemption Decision 
first auctions took place on 19 December 2016 on the 
PRISMA capacity platform. Accordingly, flows through 
OPAL significantly increased from the end of Decem-
ber 2016 until the end of January 2017,27 allowing for 
use of full capacity during the cold spell. The level is 
now back to 50 percent of capacity, after the Court of 
Justice of the EU’s decision to suspend execution of the 
exemption decision (see text box OPAL) (as of February 
2017). 
The NEL pipeline is not classified as an intercon-
nector by the Commission and is thus subject to full 
regulation by the German regulator Bundesnetzagen-
tur. This pipeline would need to be expanded in order 
to transport additional volume supplied by Nord 
Stream 2. Many stakeholders – gas traders, exporters 
and importers – made corresponding submissions to 
the 2016 network development process. The Nord 
Stream 2 expansion is modelled in Variant Q2 in the 
German 2016 network development plan and thus 
subject to regulation by the Bundesnetzagentur.28 Like 
any pipeline construction project, it also requires a 
two-stage planning permission process. 
German transmission operators expect a total addi-
tional volume of 65 billion cubic metres (Nord Stream 
1 and 2).29 In general the costs of an expansion are 
passed on to the future users of the pipeline or of the 
operator’s network as a whole. In the 2016 network 
development plan the additional costs for regulated 
expansion of the German network are estimated at 
€500 million. 
Gas from Nord Stream 2 will be transported to 
Poland, to the Czech Republic, and via the Czech 
Republic to Baumgarten (Austria). This is the conclu-
sion reached by transmission operators Gascade, 
Gasunie and Ontras on the basis of a European market 
survey to determine demand for new gas transport 
capacities at the boundaries of the north German mar-
 
on OPAL Pipeline”, press release (Brussels, 28 October 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3562_en.htm 
(accessed 15 November 2016). 
27 OPAL website, gas flow data https://ivo.opal-gastransport.biz/ 
ivo/physicalFlows?3#showData (accessed 22 February 2017). 
28 However, the 2016 network development plan is experi-
encing significant delays; it could be autumn 2017 before 
it comes into force. 
29 FNB Gas and Prognos AG, Szenariorahmen für den Netz-
entwicklungsplan Gas der Fernleitungsnetzbetreiber (Berlin, 4 Sep-
tember 2015), 37, http://www.fnb-gas.de/files/2015_09_04_nep_ 
gas_2016_szenariorahmen.pdf (accessed 8 September 2016). 
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ket area Gaspool.30 These capacities have been offered 
at Prisma platform at the beginning of March 2017. 
The auctions largely confirmed the results of the mar-
ket survey.31 Now a completely new pipeline to the 
Czech Republic is planned, named EUGAL and run-
ning largely parallel to OPAL. 
The market survey process and planning steps for 
EUGAL are interesting in several respects. The object of 
the study was to estimate future demand for transport 
capacity between market areas as early and realistically 
as possible, in order to expand the gas pipeline infra-
structure accordingly. The participation of eight mar-
ket participants in a voluntary survey (and thus more 
than the then six members of the Nord Stream 2 con-
sortium) underlines the great interest in gas sourcing 
and in expanding cross-border transport links. 
Another aspect is also notable in relation to the 
chosen method of the market survey: the transmission 
operator relied on an auction mechanism comparable 
to procedures under the network code for capacity 
allocation (NC CAM). Provisions for incremental and 
new capacities were previously lacking (see text box 
South Stream, p. 15) and are in the comitology pro-
cedure. The European Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) sent its draft amendment to 
the network code to the Commission for approval on 
13 October 2015. If the Code achieves legally binding 
status in time, the first auctions could take place in 
July 2017.32 The relationship between the new market 
survey method and network development planning 
is largely open, but the aim is to make EUGAL part 
of the German Ten-Year-Network Development Plan 
2018. But the signs are that the EUGAL market survey 
is covered by the new code. With Gascade, an already 
certified transmission operator is proposed to run 
EUGAL. The transport capacities will be auctioned on 
the capacity trading platform PRISMA.33 
To summarise, onshore sections of the Nord Stream 
2 are planned as part of the regulated process. For the 
offshore part of the Nord Stream 2 system, however, 
 
30 See “New Capacities for Tomorrow’s Gas Transport”, More 
Capacity website (Gascade Gastransport GmbH), http://www. 
more-capacity.eu/aktuelles/ (accessed 31 August 2016). 
31  https://www.more-capacity.eu/en/news/press-release/ 
news/successful-auctions-for-new-transport-capacities/ 
(accessed 9 March 2017). 
32 See “Gasmarkt Deutschland”, Energate 1 (2016), 20–21; ACER, 
Public Consultation (see note 24), and idem., Incremental Capacity, 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/gas/framework%20guidelines_ 
and_network%20codes/pages/incremental-capacity.aspx 
(accessed 15 November 2016). 
33 Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2 (see note 7), 26. 
there is no regulatory regime recognised by all parties. 
Instrumentalising the Third Energy Market Package as 
leverage to obstruct construction and operation of 
the submarine pipeline would be problematic with re-
spect to the requirement that the Commission remain 
neutral in regulatory matters and the requirement for 
a transparent and predictable legal framework,34 and 
almost incompatible with the Commission’s function 
as guardian of the treaties. It would also be tanta-
mount to a paradigm shift and contradict the prin-
ciples of free-market competition. At this juncture it is 
namely relevant that no public funding is required to 
realise the project. 
 
 
 
34 Goldthau also follows this argument, ibid., 21. 
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Nord Stream 2 and the gas supply in north-
western Europe 
Nord Stream 2 AG and its supporting European gas 
companies act against a market background whose 
future developments are increasingly difficult to pre-
dict. Their planning and application for a new pipe-
line into Europe are based on sound market analysis. 
The north-west European gas markets have experi-
enced rapid development since 2009/10. Oversupply 
has not only expedited the implementation of the 
third internal market package, but also created a 
comfortable supply situation. In this buyer’s market 
the hubs in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, and also increasingly in Germany, profit 
from competition, from numerous new potential sup-
ply sources and channels, and from the liquidity of 
the markets. Because they are well networked (via in-
terconnectors), the prices at the hubs correlate and 
correspond. That is reflected in lower prices (and 
greater benefits to consumers). Although price differ-
ences between EU market areas persist, the price gap 
between “hub products” and long-term contracts has 
shrunk, as the latter have adjusted. 
Yet nonetheless, the natural gas markets in north-
western Europe face a special challenge in relation to 
security of supply. Assuming that demand will tend 
to stagnate rather than sink, rapidly declining domes-
tic production in Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom will have to be replaced. In place of 
low-calorific gas (L-gas) from German and Dutch fields, 
gas with a higher calorific value (H-gas) will have to be 
integrated into the system. With North Sea production 
also falling, the share of imported gas in the EU will 
continue to rise. This is also reflected in the network 
development planning: Germany’s annual gas demand 
is forecast to decline only slightly, from 91.5 billion 
cubic metres in 2016 to 86.3 billion cubic metres in 
2026.35 But with production more than halving in the 
same period, from 8.8 billion cubic metres to 3.8 bil-
 
35 Own conversion to billion cubic metres from data in FNB 
Gas, Konsultationsdokument zum Netzentwicklungsplan 2016 (Ber-
lin, 15 February 2016), 19, http://www.fnb-gas.de/files/2016_ 
02_12-konsultationsdokument_nep-gas-2016.pdf (accessed 
8 September 2016). 
lion cubic metres, imports will remain at about the 
same level (2016: 81.9 billion cubic metres; 2026: 
81.5 billion cubic metres).36 For the EU as a whole too, 
there will be an additional import gap besides the ex-
pected constant import needs of 170 billion cubic 
metres annually until 2035.37 Norwegian production 
will also fall sharply from 2023, barring rapid major 
investment. In this situation, there is more than estab-
lished relations to make Russia a preferred partner. 
Nord Stream 2 connects the German and European gas 
markets to the largest gas fields in western Siberia and 
the Yamal Peninsula. Physical bottlenecks are not to 
be expected in connection with these reserves, because 
Gazprom maintains considerably more than 100 bil-
lion cubic metres of spare annual production capac-
ity.38 The direct connection through the Baltic Sea and 
onward transport via Germany keeps transport risks 
low, because the German gas market is organised in 
a highly competitive, liberalised and diversified man-
ner. Gazprom is also known in the markets for hold-
ing adequate reserves, and has invested in storage 
capacities in the EU. With European production fall-
ing – and removing a source of flexibility close to the 
consumer – that is at least in theory an important 
component of a reliable gas supply. 
Nord Stream 2: Price trends and liquidity 
The German market areas – Gaspool in the north and 
NetConnect Germany in the south – with their virtual 
trading points, gas transmission operators and traders 
will benefit just as much from Nord Stream 2 as the 
Austrian market area and its Central European Gas 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 34. The demand scenarios exhibite a wide range of 
variation, see ENTSOG, Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2015 – 
Main Report (April 2015), http://www.entsog.eu/publications/ 
tyndp#entsog-ten-year-network-development-plan-2015 
(accessed 8 September 2016). 
38 For a detailed discussion of the situation in the Russian 
gas market, see Alexander Gusev and Kirsten Westphal, 
Russian Energy Policies Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Crisis 
in Ukraine on Russian Energy Policies and Specifying the Implications 
for German and EU Energy Policies, SWP Research Paper 8/2015 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2015). 
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Hub (CEGH). Expansion of the pipelines through 
the Baltic Sea to Germany and the Czech Republic 
strengthens the physical hub at Baumgarten, too. 
Liquidity in these markets increases significantly, 
multiplies the welfare gains from falling gas prices 
and optimises consumer surplus.39 
Contrary to widespread misconceptions, the pro-
ject’s construction costs will not increase gas prices, 
because gas prices in the EU are contractual or market 
prices and not subject to cost-plus arrangements. The 
risk of higher transport costs is borne by the gas sup-
plier. 
In the German market areas public funding is not 
provided for network expansion. In the EU in general 
transport costs in the regulated market segment are 
borne by the gas suppliers. Tariffs for connecting pipe-
lines in Germany are set by the German regulator Bun-
desnetzagentur, taking account of amortisation and 
operating costs. Gas traders and suppliers pay for 
actual use of either a pipeline or an entire network. 
Whereas the German transmission operators are largely 
private-sector, a state transmission operator domi-
nates in most other EU member states. In theory the 
risk of “stranded investments” exists where losses 
incurred by a state operator must be borne by the 
taxpayer. 
The question of whether further expansion of gas 
relations with Russia will contribute to creating a 
liquid and securely supplied EU market will depend 
on how strictly the EU competition rules are enforced, 
and above all also whether other flexibility and im-
port options are created (also on the demand side). 
Utilisation of new infrastructure will depend on price 
developments, for which in turn regional and global 
fluctuations in supply and demand for pipeline gas 
and LNG are decisive. Gazprom has already adapted 
its marketing strategies, including for example gas 
auctions in the German and Baltic markets. Moreover, 
largely ignored by the EU, a liberalisation is under 
way in Russia’s own gas market, which could result 
in future in a breaking-up of Gazprom’s monopoly on 
exports to Europe.40 As the gas volumes traded at the 
SPIMEX in St Petersburg are simultaneously increas-
ing, the Nord Stream system could in future work as 
“communicating tubes” between the German and the 
Russian markets.41 
 
39 ACER and CEER, Annual Report (see note 7), 169; 
Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2 (see note 7), 27. 
40 Gusev and Westphal, Russian Energy Policies Revisited 
(see note 38), 18–31. 
41 We owe this thought to Tatiana Mitrova. 
Transit through Ukraine and 
unresolved problems 
The largest gas markets in north-western Europe (Ger-
many, France, United Kingdom) rely only partially 
or not at all on transit through Ukraine (see Table 1). 
The only exception among major gas markets is Italy, 
whose operator ENI was involved in the South Stream 
project and also discussed as a member of the Nord 
Stream 2 consortium. Table 1 shows what proportion 
of their gas member states receive via Ukraine. 
Ukraine’s moves towards the EU have been accom-
panied since the security crisis of 2014 by a radical 
reduction in its own gas consumption, a similar reduc-
tion in gas imports from Russia and an increase in gas 
imports from the EU via reverse flows. Beginning with 
a physical flow-reversal of 15 billion cubic metres 
annually at the Slovak-Ukrainian border from Septem-
ber 2014, Ukraine has acquired the ability to import 
20 billion cubic metres annually from the West (in-
cluding 5 billion cubic metres from Poland and Hun-
gary). These capacities are thus larger than its import 
needs.42 Between 2013 and 2015 Ukrainian gas con-
sumption fell from 50.4 billion cubic metres annually 
to 33.8 billion. Imports in 2015 were 16.5 billion cubic 
metres, of which 60 percent came from the EU.43 
Ukraine itself now relies on receiving (Russian) gas 
from the west. Interestingly, west-east gas flows to 
Ukraine were initially largely politically motivated, 
but later also spurred by economic considerations, 
as for a time the gas available from the west was 
cheaper.44 
One of the main economic arguments against 
Nord Stream 2 is the loss of about $2 billion in annual 
transit revenues for Ukraine.45 However, as Goldthau 
rightly points out, although Ukraine would lose trans-
port fees it has already gained price advantages from 
the reverse flow of Russian gas.46 
As well as affecting the country’s gas imports, the 
crisis over Ukraine accelerated reforms in the Ukrain-
ian gas sector. Russia and Ukraine are still wrangling 
over the legal and contractual framework; the supply 
 
42 Yuriy Vitrenko, “Naftogaz Procurement Strategy in Europe: 
Switching from East to West?” PowerPoint presentation at 
E-world Congress 2016, 16 February 2016, International Gas 
Market, Part 2: The European Development, slide 2. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ACER and CEER, Annual Report (see note 7), 253–54. 
45 “Nord Stream-2 Pipeline to Kill Ukraine’s Gas Transit 
Business – Naftogaz CEO”, Reuters, 6 November 2015. 
46 Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2 (see note 7), 6. 
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Table 1 
European gas imports from Russia (billion cubic metres), share of total imports and  
gross domestic consumption (billion cubic metres) 
Country Imports from Russia 
2000 2005 2010 2014 2015 
Russian share of 
total volume 2014 
Gross domestic 
consumption 2014
Countries receiving their entire  
Russian gas imports via Ukraine 
       
Italy  21.0  23.3  15.0  25.8  21.7  39%  60.3 
Austria*  5.1  6.8  5.6  4.2  5.0  31%  7.7 
Greece  1.5  2.4  2.1  1.7  2.0  57%  3.0 
Bulgaria  3.3  3.0  2.6  2.8  3.1  94%  2.8 
Czech Republic  7.2  7.1  7.5  0.8  0.9  87%  7.4 
Romania  3.4  5.3  2.2  0.5  0.3  4%  11.1 
Slovenia  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.5  37%  0.7 
Slovakia  7.0  7.4  6.1  4.4  3.8  105%  4.5 
Serbia  1.1  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.9  70%  1.9 
Croatia  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.6  0.6  0%  2.4 
Hungary  7.9  8.8  9.1  5.4  6.0  93%  8.3 
Countries receiving part of their  
Russian gas imports via Ukraine 
       
France  12.0  9.5  7.5  7.6  10.5  14%  38.8 
Poland  6.6  6.9  9.8  9.1  8.9  55%  16.0 
Turkey  10.1  17.5  17.6  15.5  22.5  29%  47.8 
Countries receiving no  
Russian gas imports via Ukraine 
       
Germany  34.7  38.2  34.0  40.3  47.4  38%  76.2 
Finland  4.2  4.4  4.7  3.1  2.8  100%  3.0 
Netherlands  0  4.4  4.0  4.7  8.4  6%  34.6 
Denmark  0  0  0  0.4  0.7  0%  3.3 
Estonia  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.4  0.5  100%  0.5 
Latvia  1.4  1.8  1.1  1.0  1.3  72%  1.3 
Lithuania  2.5  3.1  3.1  2.5  2.2  98%  2.5 
United Kingdom*  0  3.8  10.7  15.5  22.5  18%  71.1 
* Source: Gazprom, Gazprom in Figures 2000–2004 (2005), 29, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/20/985450/3statistikan.pdf; idem., 
Gazprom in Figures 2005–2009: Factbook (2010), http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/gazprom-in-figures-2009-en.xls; idem., 
Gazprom in Figures 2010–2014: The Power of Growth (2015), 82, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/00/463337/gazprom-in-figures-2010-2014-
en.pdf (all accessed 17 November 2016).  
Total volume = production + imports + change in stocks, Source: Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, Russian Gas Transit across Ukraine 
Post-2019: Pipeline Scenarios, Gas Flow Consequences, and Regulatory Constraints, OIES Paper NG 105 (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies [OIES], February 2016), 60/61; Eurostat. 
 
and transit contracts concluded in 2009 do not 
actually expire until 31 December 2019.47 But Ukraine, 
like the states of the Western Balkans and Moldova, 
 
47 Jonas Grätz and Kirsten Westphal, Ende gut, alles gut? Das 
russisch-ukrainische Gasabkommen auf dem Prüfstand, SWP-Aktuell 
3/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 
2009). 
has joined the European Energy Community and thus 
committed itself to gradually adopt the parts of the 
acquis communautaire relevant to the energy market. 
Accordingly it implemented in its national legislation 
first of all EU primary law (April 2015) and then suc-
cessively the secondary legislation from the EU’s third 
internal market package (in November and December 
2015). The extent to which – and when – the new tran-
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sit regime, the access rules (in other words the cor-
responding network code),48 and the transport tariff 
are implemented, and what repercussions that will 
have on the ten-year gas contract with Russia 
concluded in 2009 remains unclear.49 
From Kiev’s perspective technical considerations 
also come into play, alongside the declared aim of 
“amortising” the “transit pipeline” in the remaining 
period until 2019. Cost-based transport pricing is 
standard practice in the EU. In the case of Ukraine 
there are good reasons to suppose that that principle 
will not be entirely simple to implement. As Table 1 
shows, gas transit through Ukraine has declined with 
each new pipeline from Russia to the EU (Yamal Pipe-
line and Nord Stream). Additionally, gas consumption 
in Ukraine itself has plummeted. At the same time, 
the transit system inherited from the Soviet era is 
closely interconnected with the Ukrainian gas supply 
network and optimally dimensioned for much larger 
volumes. If actually transmitted gas volumes decline 
any further this could create and exacerbate technical 
problems. In principle, a spin-off of one of the con-
nections for transit to western Europe (for example 
Pomary–Uzhgorod with an annual capacity of approxi-
mately 30 billion cubic metres) would be necessary. 
That in turn would require considerable investment, 
which should also be reflected in the high transit fees. 
These factors are absolutely decisive for the question 
of whether and with what capacity the Ukrainian tran-
sit corridor survives as a flexibility option for Europe 
(and Russia). Alongside unbundling, the Ukrainian 
pipeline network needs a “business model” that gives 
investors a long-term perspective. Basically what is 
needed here is an exemption for transit of Russian gas 
through Ukraine under the new framework of the 
third energy market package. 
The transit regime is not the only bone of conten-
tion; the supply contract and old debts also generate 
friction. Here arbitration cases are in progress, with 
each side demanding huge sums. That contains quite 
some conflict potential and also represents a threat 
to the EU’s security of supply. 
 
48 Under the EU’s third internal market package, network 
codes govern pipeline access, congestion management and 
tariff arrangements. 
49 “Ukraine Network Code Aims to Liberalise, but Hurdles 
Remain”, Heren Report, 4 August 2015, 14/15. 
The gas markets in central eastern Europe 
While Germany and the north-west European hubs 
will profit economically from Nord Stream 2, an 
analysis of the central eastern and south-east Euro-
pean (and also Baltic) EU gas markets produces a much 
more mixed picture. The small central eastern and 
south-east European markets are highly dependent on 
both Russian gas supplies and Ukrainian transit. These 
countries also pay the highest wholesale gas prices.50 
There are several reasons for the persistence of price 
differences within the EU: specific contractual arrange-
ments, different main supply sources and diverging 
competition and liquidity situations in the individual 
member states.51 While it is apparent that the develop-
ment of the internal markets has produced welfare 
gains overall, the consumer surplus is very unequally 
distributed among the member states.52 The higher 
import prices paid by certain states are caused by the 
market dominance of a single source (Gazprom), but 
also the weaker interconnection of and restrained 
competition within their gas markets.53 These coun-
tries have long been eager to diversify their gas sup-
plies and object to Gazprom’s market power and the 
political instrumentalisation thereof. This explains 
their vehement opposition to Nord Stream. 
Table 2 (see p. 23) illustrates Gazprom’s central mar-
ket position. Central eastern and south-eastern Europe 
import most of their gas from Russia (see Table 1, p. 21). 
And these supplies are routed exclusively via Ukraine. 
In central and eastern Europe Gazprom possesses a 
market share far exceeding 50 percent and in some 
cases up to 100 percent. Abuses of Gazprom’s monopoly 
were the subject of a Commission anti-trust investiga-
tion, whose findings were published in April 2015:54 
According to the report Gazprom had included terri-
torial restrictions such as export ban and destination 
clauses in its supply contracts with Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Slovakia. It also ruled that the prices set for Bul-
garia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were un-
 
50 European Commission, DG Energy, Quarterly Report on Euro-
pean Gas Markets, Market Observatory for Energy 9, no. 1 (2015/16), 
29, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/ 
quarterly_report_on_european_gas_markets_q4_2015-q1_ 
2016.pdf (accessed 8 September 2016). 
51 ACER and CEER, Annual Report (see note 7), 237. 
52 Ibid., 242–50. 
53 Ibid., 239. 
54 European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement 
of Objections to Gazprom – Fact Sheet (Brussels, 22 April 2015). 
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Table 2: Long-term supply contracts in selected central and eastern European states 
Country Annual contract 
volume  
(billion m3) 
Expires Annual con-
sumption 2014 
(billion m3) 
Annual contract 
volume as propor-
tion of 2014 con-
sumption 
Importer Main shareholder 
Bulgaria  0.4 2019a  2.8b  117.8% Overgas Gazpromc (50%) 
  2.9d 2022   Bulgargaz Holding 
EAD (subsidiary of 
Bulgarian Energy 
Holding EAD)e 
Bulgarian state 
Czech 
Republic 
 9.0f 2035  7.35  129.2% RWE Supply & 
Trading CZ a.s. 
RWE AG 
  0.5 2017g   Vemex s.r.o Gazpromh (50%) 
Poland 10.24i 2022 15.95  64.2% PGNiG  Polish state 
Hungary  9.9 2015 
(extended 
to 2019k) 
 8.3  119.3% Panrusgaz Hungarian state / 
Gazproml 
Romania  5.0m 2030 11.14  62.8% WIEE Romania Romanian state / 
Gazpromn 
  2.0o 2030   Conef Energy Conef SA (Vimetco N.V.) 
Slovakia  6.5 2028  4.5 (4.48)  145.0% SPP Slovak statep 
Slovenia  0.83q 2018 
(2035) 
  0.745  111.4% Geoplin Plinovodi Slovenian stater 
Table based on a compendium by Regionális Energiagazdasági Kutatóközpont (REKK)/Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research (RCEPR), 
Budapest. 
a “Overgas Takes Gazprom to Court over Halt in Supplies”, novi-
nite.com, 7 April 2016, http://www.novinite.com/articles/173914/ 
Overgas+Takes+ Gazprom+to+Court+over+Halt+in+ Supplies 
(accessed 12 Dec. 16). 
b Consumption data (2014): http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa. eu/ 
nui/show.do?dataset=nrg_103a&lang=en, converted to billion m3 
on Delek Drilling website, http://www.delekenergy.co.il/?pg= 
calc&CategoryID=198 (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
c “Foreign Partners: Bulgaria”, Gazprom Export website, http:// 
www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/ (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
d “Bulgaria Signs on to South Stream”, Natural Gas World web-
site, 15 November 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/ 
bulgaria-gas-contract-south-stream-fid (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
e “Foreign Partners: Bulgaria“ (see note c). 
f RWE Transgas, Annual Report (Prague, March 2007), http://www. 
rwe.cz/media/o-rwe/rwe/RWE_Transgas-EN.pdf (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
g “Foreign Partners: Czech Republic”, Gazprom Export website, 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/czech/ (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
h “Vemex Ownership Structure”, Vemex s.r.o. website, http:// 
www.vemex.cz/en/about/structure/ (accessed 12 Dec. 16). 
i “PGNiG SA Signs an Annex to the Yamal Contract for Natural 
Gas Supplies”, PGNIG SA website, 2 November 2010, http://bit.ly/ 
2fw5Sg5 (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
j “Shareholder Structure of PGNiG SA”, PGNiG SA website, http:// 
en.pgnig.pl/investor-relations/stock-informations/shareholder-
structure. 
k “Press-Konferentsiya po zawerschenii rossijsko-wengerskih 
peregpworow” [Press conference following conclusion of Russia-
Hungary talks], Kremlin.ru website, 17 February 2016, http:// 
kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/51352 (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
l “State Energy Group MVM Buys 50% of Panrusgaz under 
Option”, Budapest Business Journal, 16 February 2015, http:// 
bbj.hu/economy/state-energy-group-mvm-buys-50-of-panrusgaz-
under-option_92607; “About Us”, Panrusgaz Gas Trading PLC 
website, http://www.panrusgaz.hu/ (accessed 12 Dec. 16). 
m Gazprom Export, Gazprom Press Conference 2010 – Booklet (Mos-
cow, 2010), http://www.gazpromvideo.ru/fileadmin/press/2010/ 
files/eng/layout_eng_02.06.pdf (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
n Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Gazprom’s Expansion in the EU: Co-opera-
tion or Domination? (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies [OSW], 
October 2009), 31, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/gp_ 
eu_10_09_en.pdf (accessed 12 Dec. 16). 
o “‘Gazprom’ i Conef Energy SRL podpisali dolgosrotschnij kon-
trakt na postawku gaza w Ruminiyu” [Gazprom and Conef Energy 
SRL sign long-term contract for gas deliveries to Romania], Gaz-
prom.ru website, 4 April 2007, http://www.gazprom.ru/press/ 
news/2007/april/ article56131/ (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
p “Foreign Partners: Slovakia”, Gazprom Export website, http:// 
www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/slovakia/ (accessed 12 Dec. 16). 
q Gazprom Export [company brochure] (2013), http://www.gazprom 
export.ru/content/file/broshure/ge_en_2013.pdf (accessed 8 Sept. 16). 
r “Organisational and Ownership Structure of the Company”, 
Geoplin website, http://www.geoplin.si/en/company-geoplin/ 
organisational-and-ownership-structure-company-0 (accessed 
12 Dec. 16). 
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fair, because they exceeded the benchmarks in other 
markets, in some case by up to 40 percent.55 Gazprom, 
it found, had also made the sale of gas conditional on 
the participation of the incumbent in a major infra-
structure project (South Stream, Bulgaria). In Poland 
Gazprom is reported to have tied gas supplies to con-
trol over investment decisions in connection with the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline. Since autumn 2016 there have 
been increasing signs that the Commission and Gaz-
prom have reached a compromise, although the 
details remain unknown (as of February 2017). That 
might mean that Gazprom will act to bring its market 
strategies in central eastern Europe into line with EU 
rules. Or it could mean that the EU’s evidence is not 
solid enough to insist on fines in this politically sen-
sitive case. 
Regardless of these current developments, the 
attitude of the central eastern and south-east Euro-
pean states towards Gazprom remains very critical. 
Their geographical situation, existing long-term con-
tracts and the comparatively small volumes of gas 
involved make it hard for these countries to diversify. 
Long-term contracts with Russia cover most of their 
demand for many years, and in some cases even 
exceed annual requirements (see Table 2, p. 23). Thus, 
major diversification and infrastructure projects are 
not worthwhile in these generally small gas markets. 
This is also a reason why the EU has to date failed to 
realise major alternative supply corridors (such as 
Nabucco). These countries lack the negotiating power 
to achieve price concessions, all the more so where 
alternative import options are lacking. In this situa-
tion it is easy for suppliers to segment markets and 
apply pricing tactics.56 In some of these countries 
implementation of the third internal market package 
is slow, with established operators preventing the 
expansion of cross-border trade. Nevertheless, efficient 
network development and full use of cross-border 
capacity are the key to a cheap and reliable gas supply 
in the EU. 
In the event of significant gas volumes being routed 
via Nord Stream 2 to parts of south-eastern Europe the 
number of entries and exits for transit would increase 
and the gas would have to be transported through a 
series of market areas. Cross-border bottlenecks and 
tariff barriers are worst in southern and south-eastern 
Europe, but also exist between Germany and Poland, 
 
55 Najia Badykova, “Politics and Pricing Sharpen Gazprom’s 
Competitive Edge”, Newsbase, (online), 16 September 2015, 5. 
56 ACER and CEER, Annual Report (see note 7), 240. 
Germany and Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria, Bulgaria and Greece, and 
Slovenia and Croatia. However, the “use it or lose it” 
(UIOLI) rule introduced in July 2016 for entry/exit 
points and nodes with limited spare capacity requires 
that unused capacities be made available to other 
operators.57 
On account of the long distances, Nord Stream 2 
is unlikely to fully supply south-eastern Europe. But 
these countries worry that the rerouting of gas vol-
umes for north-western Europe through the Baltic 
could face them with two issues: Firstly, they are con-
cerned that Gazprom could target its market power 
significantly more precisely by ensuring adequate 
supplies only to the north-west European markets (via 
Nord Stream 2), but instrumentalising the volumes 
flowing (via the Ukrainian corridor) to central eastern 
and south-east European markets and Ukraine itself. 
These concerns are based partly on the findings of the 
anti-trust investigation against Gazprom and partly 
on the experience of supply reductions by Gazprom 
between November 2014 and March 2015, which were 
apparently intended to make it harder or impossible 
for Ukraine to receive supplies through the western 
entry points. Secondly and more importantly, they 
also fear that loss of transit status will weaken their 
position in talks with Russia. Although these concerns 
cannot be rejected out of hand, the situation from the 
perspective of the north-west European markets ap-
pears rather different. Here the perceived danger is 
becoming drawn into political quarrels between tran-
sit states and Russia (regardless of who is to blame). 
Nord Stream and changing gas flows in 
eastern Europe 
The completion of Nord Stream 1 and the expansion 
of interconnectors between member states have ex-
panded west-east gas flows within Europe and the EU. 
Traditionally the direction has been east to west. In 
the wake of the Ukraine-Russia crisis of 2009 and the 
European Regulation on measures to safeguard secu-
rity of gas supply adopted a year later, connections 
into the eastern EU member states were upgraded, 
and by 2014 it was possible to supply Ukraine from 
the west via reverse-flow options. Although east-west 
flows still predominate on account of the existing 
long-term contracts and fixed delivery periods, with  
 
57 Ibid., 251. 
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Figure 2 
Natural gas flows in central eastern Europe (billion 
cubic metres per annum), east-west and west-east 
Note: East–west flows: Ukraine–Slovakia, Slovakia–Austria, Czech 
Republic–Germany, Slovakia–Czech Republic, Austria–Germany, 
Czech Republic–Austria; west–east: Germany–Czech Republic, 
Czech Republic–Slovakia, Slovakia–Ukraine, Germany–Austria. 
Source: “Gas Trade Flows in Europe, in Mcm”, International 
Energy Agency (IEA) website, (2016), http://www.iea.org/gtf/ 
index.asp (accessed 2 December 2016). 
Gazprom holding fixed transit capacities and retain-
ing ownership of the gas through to the point of 
delivery, west-east flows have nonetheless increased 
(see Figure 2).58 Gas supplies from the west involve a 
series of commercial transactions. Figure 2 illustrates 
clearly what occurred after Nord Stream 1 came on 
stream. Further, the study by ACER and CEER shows 
that these west-east flows have boosted gas/gas com-
petition. In a nutshell, this generally means gas pur-
chased at the hubs in north-western Europe compet-
ing with Russian gas from the existing long-term 
contracts.59 So these developments have granted cen-
tral eastern European member states and Ukraine 
access to cheaper (mostly Russian) gas. 
The expansion of interconnectors has thus strength-
ened competition and influenced prices. In relation to 
the question of the effects to be expected in connec-
tion with Nord Stream 2, the decisive aspects are which 
route gas from the long-term contracts takes and how 
much technical and contractual free capacity is avail-
able at the cross-border transmission interconnection 
points. The interconnectors were constructed to trans-
port gas from alternative sources traded on the spot 
 
58 Ibid., 260. 
59 Ibid., 17–18; Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2 (see note 7), 6. 
markets (including “Russian” gas) to the east (as far as 
Ukraine) and south-eastern Europe. There are concerns 
that cross-border interconnection points will become 
congested if gas from the long-term contracts is also 
transported from west to east, and that this could 
isolate the markets. This would curtail competition 
and prices would remain high. However, the technical 
cross-border capacities exceed the contracted volumes. 
There is also reason to believe that Gazprom is inter-
ested in renegotiating delivery points for the long-
term contracts. This, conversely, would give these 
countries an opportunity to agree new arrangements 
for example for purchase obligations. Internal market 
integration could be advanced through the expansion 
of interconnector capacities and the dismantling of 
tariff and regulatory obstacles in central eastern and 
south-eastern Europe. 
However, there are also objections that the estab-
lishment of a north-south corridor in western Europe 
would prevent the development of a north-south 
corridor in eastern Europe (to access alternative gas 
sources).60 Nord Stream 2 thus pits advantages for 
some member states against drawbacks for others: and 
as such touches on the political question of solidarity 
within the EU. 
 
 
 
60 Agata Łoskot-Strachota and Pawel Poplawski, “EUGAL: The 
Unknown German Branch of Nord Stream 2 Will Make Ger-
many the Key Gas Hub in Europe”, Energy Post (online), 6 June 
2016, http://www.energypost.eu/eugal-project-unknown-
german-branch-nord-stream-2-will-make-germany-key-gas-hub-
europe/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
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Nord Stream 2 – The Political Dimension 
 
The Nord Stream 2 project and the function of the 
Ukrainian corridor are highly politically charged. The 
project is seen in light of the crisis over Ukraine and 
the challenge to the security order in Europe. Thus, 
security concerns and military considerations even 
surround the planned construction through the Baltic 
Sea. Sweden rejected plans to use the strategically 
sensitive island of Gotland as a base for construction 
because of worries about national security. Yet, the 
port of Karlshamn may be used for the same pur-
pose.61 This episode illustrates that the planning of 
Nord Stream 2 is taking place in a completely differ-
ent security and political environment than Nord 
Stream 1. Sweden is vigilant because Russian military 
activity has increased in the Baltic Sea since 2014. At 
the end of January 2017 Stockholm, together with 
Copenhagen, therefore asked the European Commis-
sion to assess the legal and political dimensions of the 
pipeline project and to report back to the member 
states.62 
Exacerbating an already difficult political situation, 
Russia is supporting illiberal movements in the EU that 
contest European integration. Thus, there is a growing 
impression within the EU that the Kremlin’s intention 
is to weaken the cohesion of the Union (also with the 
“wedge” of Nord Stream 2). 
Yet, above all Nord Stream 2 faces political scrutiny 
with respect to the intentions associated with the 
Energy Union. The Nord Stream 2 project consortium 
was unveiled in 2015, just a few months after the 
Juncker Commission declared the creation of the En-
ergy Union one of its ten priorities. The crisis over 
Ukraine and the further deterioration of European-
Russian relations supplied the impetus for the April 
2014 proposal by then Polish Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk. According to this, the Energy Union was to con-
centrate primarily on security of gas supply and work 
 
61 “Sweden Drops Objections to Port Striking Nord Stream 
Deal”, Reuters, 30 January 2017, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-sweden-nordstream-idUSKBN15E1RI (accessed 
28 February 2017). 
62 Letter of 25 January 2017 from the Danish Ministry of 
Energy, Utlilities and Climate and the Swedish Prime Minis-
ter’s Office to the Vice President of the Commission and the 
Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy. 
to diversify energy sources. But since then the objec-
tives have broadened. The strategy for implementing 
the Energy Union, which is based on ideas of trust and 
solidarity, names five dimensions: security and diver-
sification of supply, a fully integrated internal market, 
energy efficiency, decarbonisation of the economy, 
and support for research, innovation and competitive-
ness.63 The Commission would also like to see the 
Regulation on security of gas supply of 2010 adapted 
to the new circumstances. In a word: the Nord Stream 
2 project appeared on the scene at a highly sensitive 
moment. 
Nord Stream 2 and the strategic 
energy triangle 
The criteria of security of supply and diversification 
play a part in the political deliberations, alongside 
their regulatory role in the granting of exemptions. It 
will be much harder for the EU to judge Nord Stream 
2 in economic and energy terms than it is for the par-
ticipating companies to assess its commercial viabil-
ity. The reason for this is above all that the weighting 
of targets in the energy triangle – security of supply, 
competitiveness and sustainability is subject to indi-
vidual political prioritisations in the member states. 
And these diverge considerably. 
Definitions of security of supply differ within the 
EU depending on how particular aspects – physical 
supply failure, price spikes, political costs – are 
weighted. The EU member states also apply very dif-
ferent governance principles to their energy markets. 
While Germany leaves security of supply primarily 
to private-sector companies and the market, growing 
renationalisation tendencies are observed especially in 
the central eastern European states, including neigh-
bouring Poland. Here, diversification and reducing 
imports from Russia are the watchwords. Cost/benefit 
assessments of (strategic and costly) diversification 
projects diverge accordingly. These asymmetries are 
 
63 European Commission, Priority – Energy Union and Climate: 
Making Energy More Secure, Affordable and Sustainable, ec.europa.eu/ 
priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en (accessed 11 April 2016). 
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further exacerbated by differences in implementation 
of the third internal market package within the EU. 
In essence this means that the EU lacks a united 
stance towards Gazprom. While north-west European 
gas customers regard it as a largely business-orientated, 
reliable (as in rational) company, the central and 
eastern European EU states see it above all as a geo-
political instrument of the Kremlin whose gas sup-
plies obey political considerations. Opinions on this 
fundamental question are sharply divided. 
In Germany economic interdependency between 
exporter and importer is still viewed more positively 
than in Brussels or the central eastern European 
states, in the historical context of the “Ostpolitik” and 
the “gas for pipes deals” of the 1970s. Although the 
plans for Nord Stream 2 took the German government 
by surprise in early summer 2015, a political line 
quickly emerged. First, the legal procedure is a given. 
Germany as the landfall state follows a defined appli-
cation and planning process. As soon as the project 
has been launched and applications submitted, the 
legal and regulatory trajectory is clear. Any rejection 
would have to be based on solid legal grounds. Second, 
the economic assessment of the German government 
converges with those of the participating companies, 
highlighting increasing import needs and affordable 
and abundant reserves in Russia. A responsible gov-
ernment has to take these factors into account, even 
more so because almost half of Germany’s heating 
systems run on natural gas. Third, the project is of 
symbolic significance for German foreign and eco-
nomic policy, which relies on a dual strategy of deter-
rence and cooperation towards the Kremlin. In this 
context the German handling of Nord Stream 2 al-
ready sent a clear message that this policy approach 
would be retained. Yet, there is also awareness that 
this sound economic project comes at a highly 
sensitive time politically. 
In the EU-28 energy and climate policy is riven by a 
series of fault lines, which run particularly deep in the 
case of natural gas. One side attributes it an important 
bridging function in the decarbonisation context; the 
other regards it largely as a source of growing depend-
ency on and political vulnerability to Russia and would 
like to see its share in the energy mix reduced. The 
unpredictability created by potentially 28 (27) future 
energy paths in the EU makes it difficult to assess the 
economic and energy impacts of Nord Stream 2 in 
terms of cost/benefit and security of supply, nor its 
consequences for the internal gas market. The degree 
of unpredictability varies depending on the chosen 
timeframe. 
Nord Stream 2 in the context of climate and 
environmental considerations 
The fiercest criticism of Nord Stream 2 in Germany 
comes from the environmental and climate lobby. 
Relevant studies focus on the environmental and cli-
mate compatibility of the plans and the danger of 
“stranded investments” – that would indeed exist if 
the EU achieved its climate and energy targets for 
2030 and consistently pursued the proposed decarbon-
isation path for 2050.64 Nevertheless, the share of gas 
in the energy mix will indeed have to fall in the longer 
term in light of the long-term goal of carbon-neutral-
ity noted in the Paris Agreement of 2015. What the 
critics neglect, however, is the climate benefits of a 
direct, modern and efficient pipeline as against an 
outdated system. Even more importantly, what these 
views ignore is that network planning in the EU has 
for good reason been based to date not on normative 
scenarios, but rather on “best-guess” scenarios. This 
follows the responsible device of “better safe, than 
sorry”.65 
Moreover, modelling the utilisation path poses dif-
ficulties, because political decisions are still awaited 
on the role of gas in the process of rapidly and effec-
tively reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Gas is 
regarded as a bridge to a more sustainable energy 
system, because it burns much more cleanly than coal 
or oil products and produces less particulate pollu-
tion.66 One obvious dilemma remains politically un-
resolved: the future demand situation in Germany and 
 
64 Examples include: Energy Union Choices, A Perspective on 
Infrastructure and Energy Security in the Transition, July 2016, 
http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/ 
Energy_Union_Choices_Gas/EUC_Full_Techincal_Report_ 
Embargoed_10.00_CET_3_March_1__2_.pdf (accessed 8 Sep-
tember 2016), and Jonathan Gaventa, Manon Dufour and 
Luca Bergamaschi, More Security, Lower Cost: A Smarter Approach 
to Gas Infrastructure in Europe, E3G Energy Union Insight Series 
1 (Berlin, March 2016). 
65 Jens Hobohm, “Gas Scenarios and Infrastructure Planning 
in the EU: Better Safe than Sorry”. Talk at E-World Essen, 7 
February 2017. 
66 Taking the entire chain into account, methane leakage 
could also significantly worsen the climate balance of natural 
gas, as methane is a much more powerful greenhouse gas 
than carbon dioxide (although with a considerably shorter 
atmospheric residence time). However, effective precautions 
can be taken. 
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the EU is associated with great uncertainty, because it 
depends not only on relative price developments, but 
also on the implementation of measures in the areas 
of energy efficiency, electrification and ‘sectoral coupl-
ing’.67 On the basis of today’s knowledge, demand can 
only be estimated very vaguely (see Chapter “Market 
Trends”, pp. 19 ff.). In short, political decision-makers 
have yet to resolve the extent to which public funds 
will (still) be provided for the development (expansion) 
of fossil fuel infrastructure, and what the basis should 
be for assessing these projects within the strategic tri-
angle.68 This question is also acutely relevant with 
respect to the need for security of supply, which relies 
on the preservation (and expansion) of flexibility and 
buffering in the system and on increasing diversifica-
tion. 
In the given open and uncertain market situation 
it is, however, part and parcel of competition and 
regular business practice for energy firms to pursue 
all kinds of paths and projects. The stranded invest-
ment risk for Nord Stream 2 is Gazprom’s. That is one 
of the features that characterises it as a commercial 
project. This perspective also tallies with the ideal of 
the free market, which predominates in Germany and 
characterises the internal market packages. Of course 
Germany exposes itself to accusations of inconsistency 
if it demands a shift in investments from fossil fuels to 
sustainable energy, but at the same time welcomes the 
construction of new gas pipelines through the Baltic 
and backs them politically vis-à-vis other EU member 
states. The reason many EU member states express 
reservations over Nord Stream, however, is not climate 
protection but because they see it contradicting their 
efforts to improve their security of supply by diversify-
ing their energy sources. 
Criticisms from central eastern and south-
eastern Europe 
While Nord Stream 2 strengthens the gas markets in 
north-western and western Europe, with their liquid 
 
67 Relative price trends play an important role with natural 
gas, which competes with other energy sources and raw ma-
terials in almost all fields (heat and power, industry, trans-
port). 
68 The concluding chapter of a study by Energy Union Choices 
airs the provocative question of whether public institutions 
should be controlling or even authorising private invest-
ments and contracts in the fossil fuel sector, Energy Union 
Choices, A Perspective on Infrastructure (see note 64), 38. 
hubs, the effects on central eastern and south-east 
European countries are a good deal more ambivalent. 
The project therefore has consequences for relations 
among EU member states. The planning phase for 
Nord Stream 1 was already accompanied by major 
disputes, especially between Germany and its eastern 
neighbours, and to some extent also with Nordic coun-
tries. The participating companies and the political 
actors backing the project argued that diversification 
of routing and a more direct connection to the Rus-
sian gas fields would bring benefits in terms of sta-
bility of supply. In response to reservations expressed 
by central eastern European countries, it was asserted 
that the new pipeline system would merely add 
volume, with little change in existing transit flows. 
Most of these countries rejected this line of argument, 
however. For many of them the supposedly secondary 
foreign policy consequences were decisive. They feared 
not only undesirable developments in their own energy 
sectors, but also a German-Russian rapprochement 
with strategic and geopolitical consequences. If bilate-
ral tensions between Germany and its neighbours did 
not intensify when construction began or when Nord 
Stream 1 came on stream, this is partly because the 
sceptically minded countries made progress on diver-
sification and Germany was able to win their confi-
dence through its stance in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. 
The circumstances surrounding Nord Stream 2 
have changed significantly since its predecessor was 
built, however, especially concerning the motivations 
and justifications for the project. The central eastern 
European countries fear that Nord Stream 2 could 
restrict their options for improving their security of 
supply and reducing their dependency on Russia and 
at the same time undermine Ukraine in its conflict 
with Russia. They also see political intentions behind 
the project, despite German insistence that Nord 
Stream 2 is a purely commercial venture. In this con-
text they regard it principally as an egotistical venture 
at the expense of third parties. They accuse Germany 
of demanding support from its EU partners, for ex-
ample concerning refugee policy, but playing the 
solidarity card only when it suits its own interests. 
Nor should the potential consequences of another 
Nord Stream pipeline for the EU member states and 
accession candidates in south-eastern Europe be over-
looked. The transport infrastructure in some of these 
countries is historically biased towards routes coming 
out of Ukraine. If these routes were to be marginalised 
or fall away altogether, these countries would be 
forced to rapidly adapt their gas transport networks 
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with new interconnectors, which would potentially 
alter their existing infrastructure planning and force 
them to make additional investments. 
Hence it comes as no surprise that the announce-
ment of the Nord Stream 2 project provoked strong 
criticism in some quarters, especially in central 
eastern Europe, both of the project itself and of Ger-
many’s attitude. In this context, energy-related argu-
ments have been raised, as well as doubts concerning 
foreign policy and European affairs. As the energy 
ministers from seven east central and south-east Euro-
pean countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) put it in a joint letter 
to the Vice-President of the European Commission 
responsible for the Energy Union, the Nord Stream 2 
project contains “alarming aspects”, that could nega-
tively affect “energy geopolitics in Europe”.69 They also 
complain that the project contravenes the spirit of 
European energy policy and in particular violates the 
idea of energy solidarity. Nord Stream 2, they say, is 
tantamount to “dismantling the Energy Union”.70 In 
the eyes of central and eastern European countries 
termination of transit through Ukraine in the 
medium to long term would also have negative con-
sequences for EU member states presently connected 
to the Ukrainian east-west route. These would either 
lose their own role as transit countries (principally 
Slovakia) or be forced to develop new infrastructure 
for receiving Russian gas as consumers (example states 
in south-eastern Europe). This would weaken the 
affected states vis-à-vis Moscow, for example when 
negotiating new supply contracts. From the central 
and eastern European point of view, the new pipeline 
would also increase the (alleged) danger of cheap 
Russian gas from the newly dominant German hub 
(initially) flooding the markets in central Europe and 
undermining the profitability of diversification proj-
ects there (such as the construction of LNG terminals 
or interconnectors). Another point made is, that the 
transport infrastructure emerging in the region in the 
context of the north-south corridor would not be used 
to import and transport gas from alternative sources, 
 
69 Letter of 30 November 2015 from the Slovak Economic 
Affairs Minister Vazil Hudák (in the name of the energy 
ministers of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia) to Commission Vice-President Maroš 
Šefčovič. Author’s archive. 
70 Mikołaj Budzanowski, “Demontaż unii energetycznej” 
[Dismantling the Energy Union], Rzeczpospolita, 5 November 
2015. 
but largely for Russian gas.71 Central and eastern Euro-
pean observers also see a danger of firms in the Nord 
Stream 2 consortium securing political backing from 
important member states to pressure the Commission 
with the aim of overturning central principles of Euro-
pean energy policy, above all in the scope of the third 
internal market package. In concrete terms, this means 
the possibility of Gazprom succeeding in its demand 
for complete or far-reaching exemptions from the 
requirement to provide non-discriminatory third-party 
access to connecting pipelines in member states, above 
all OPAL and Gazela (a pipeline from Saxony to Bavaria 
passing through Czech territory). The decision of the 
European Commission at the end of October 2016, 
under which Gazprom will be able to use up to 80 per-
cent of the capacity of the OPAL pipeline, was accord-
ingly received largely critically in eastern EU coun-
tries, where it was seen as confirming pre-existing fears. 
Altogether, the opponents say, the EU’s security 
of supply will worsen, because Nord Stream 2 fails to 
bring about any diversification of sources but reduces 
the number of existing transport routes, leaving the 
future connection from Russia reliant – in the worst 
case – on one single route. This, they say, would make 
the Europe more vulnerable to interruptions of sup-
ply, whether technical or politically motivated. 
These strictly energy-related concerns are joined by 
foreign policy and security considerations. The critics 
view the plans for Nord Stream 2 as a political or even 
strategic flagship project, signalising deepening co-
operation during a troubled phase in relations with 
Russia and reviving a German-Russian alliance they 
had thought was a thing of the past. They also point 
to the foreign policy and security implications for 
Ukraine, and thus for European Ostpolitik as a whole. 
Nord Stream 2, they say, not only robs Ukraine of east-
west transit revenues but deprives it of the power 
deriving from its status as a vital transit channel – one 
of the few trumps still held by Kiev in its asymmetrical 
relationship with Moscow. 
Interests of individual member states 
Closer examination reveals notable differences be-
tween the interests of the states that have expressed 
their open rejection of Nord Stream 2. While many 
 
71 Agata Loskot-Strachota, “The Case against Nord Stream 2”, 
Energy Post (online), 23 November 2015, http://www.energypost. 
eu/case-nord-stream-2/#_ftnref6 (accessed 8 September 2016). 
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eastern central and south-east European countries 
take critical positions, some of them also act prag-
matically or even show interest in cooperation. 
Slovakia. If Nord Stream 2 were to be realised, Slovakia 
would definitely be one of the potentially biggest 
“losers” among the EU states. Up to 90 billion cubic 
metres of gas annually can be transported through the 
pipelines of national transmission operator Eustream. 
Falling Russian exports to western Europe and the 
completion of Nord Stream 1 caused the transit vol-
ume to shrink from 76 billion to 46.5 billion cubic 
metres since 2008.72 Eustream has a contract with 
Gazprom requiring transport of annually about 50 
billion cubic metres until 2028 (“ship-or-pay” clause). 
As such, the Slovak state’s transit revenues (amount-
ing in 2015 to €355 million) are safe for the medium 
term.73 But Gazprom could still attempt to renegotiate 
the contract before it expires or – in the worst case – 
close the Ukrainian route on grounds of force majeure 
(for example in the event of disruption to Ukrainian 
pipeline operations for technical or other reasons). 
The same applies to Gazprom’s contract with Slovak 
gas supplier SPP (also valid until 2028), which stipu-
lates acceptance at the Slovak-Ukrainian border, 
alongside contractual minimum volumes. At the end 
of June 2016 Gazprom promised Eustream verbally 
that the Slovak transport corridor would continue to 
be used even if Nord Stream 2 is built. This was seen 
as positive in Slovakia, but altogether viewed with 
caution.74 
The plan to build a new direct link between the 
Czech and Austrian networks (the BACI pipeline, see 
below) in connection with Nord Stream 2 and the 
associated expansion of deliveries reaching Baum-
garten in Austria via the OPAL pipeline and the Czech 
Republic is especially problematic for Slovakia. One 
 
72 Eustream, Výročná správa [Annual report] (Bratislava, 2014), 
http://www.eustream.sk/sk_media/sk_vyrocne-spravy (accessed 
8 September 2016). 
73 “Firma Eustream stále štedro prispieva do štátneho roz-
počtu” [Eustream continues to contribute generously to state 
budget], Portal V energetike.sk (online), 15 July 2016, http:// 
venergetike.sk/firma-eustream-stale-stedro-prispieva-do-
statneho-rozpoctu/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
74 “Uistenie Gazpromu je pozitívny signál, dôležitejšie sú 
uzavreté zmluvy” [Gazprom’s promise is an important signal, 
signed contracts are more important], Portal dennikn (online), 
1 July 2016, http://energia.dennikn.sk/spravodajstvo/zemny-
plyn-a-ropa/analytik-uistenie-gazpromu-je-pozitivny-signal-
dolezitejsie-su-uzavrete-zmluvy/20586/ (accessed 7 November 
2016).  
consequence of this would be that transport from the 
Czech Republic to Austria via Slovakia (to date the only 
route) would be reduced and could cease altogether.75 
If that project goes through it will generate significant 
stress in Czech-Slovak relations. 
Slovakia is pursuing at least two projects designed 
to expand or at least preserve its status as a transit 
country. Gas from the EU is already being sold to 
Ukraine via reverse-flow from Slovakia. If at some point 
Slovakia’s pipeline system is no longer being used in 
the east-west direction, it could serve instead to supply 
Ukraine with much larger volumes than has to date 
been the case. The Eastring project, in turn, would 
create a connection from the Slovak system to Hun-
gary (or Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria through to 
the Turkish border. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico 
discussed Eastring with his Russian hosts during a 
visit to Moscow in June 2015, plainly as a kind of sub-
stitute for the failed South Stream project that would 
have brought Russian gas into the EU from the south-
east. In recent times, however, the Eastring pipeline, 
which is conceived as reverse-flow-capable, has also 
been discussed as a means to transport gas from west-
ern or central European hubs to south-eastern Europe. 
Regardless of these uncertainties, Eastring was placed 
on the EU’s List of Projects of Common Interest when 
it was amended at the end of 2015.76 
It thus comes as no surprise that some of the most 
critical voices are Slovak. Prime Minister Fico has 
spoken (referring to the home states of the participat-
ing firms) of “betrayal”, the head of Eustream accused 
Germany of “behaving like von Ribbentrop”.77 Neither 
government circles nor the opposition would exclude 
taking a complaint to the European Court of Justice if 
Nord Stream 2 goes ahead.78 But the government has 
 
75 “Češi, Němci a Rakušané prý chtějí z tranzitu plynu vyša-
chovat Slovensko” [Czechs, Germans and Austrians supposedly 
seeking to squeeze Slovakia out of gas transit], Servis O energe-
tice (online), 21 April 2016, http://oenergetice.cz/plyn/hamzik-
cesi-nemci-a-rakusane-pry-chteji-z-tranzitu-plynu-vysachovat-
slovensko/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
76 European Commission, Annex VII: The Union List of Projects of 
Common Interest (Brussels, 18 November 2015), https://ec.europa. 
eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/5_2%20PCI%20annex.pdf. 
77 “Mareček, Hlavný problém je konanie Nemecka ŕ la von 
Ribbentrop” [Mareček, main problem is Germany behaving 
like von Ribbentrop], Energia.sk (online), 25 November 2015, 
http://energia.dennikn.sk/dolezite/zemny-plyn-a-ropa/ 
marecek-hlavny-problem-je-chovanie-nemecka-a-la-von-
ribbentrop/18413/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
78 Eventually, the Slovak prime minister said he would wait 
for the German regulator’s verdict on the project; “Slovenskí 
politici odkazujú ‘nie’ ruskému plynovodu” [Slovak politi-
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recently adopted a more moderate tone and said it 
would wait to see how the project turned out. It can-
not be ruled out that Slovakia will accommodate Nord 
Stream 2, as long as there is a convenient alternative 
ensuring gas transit. The fact that Eustream and the 
Czech grid operator Net4Gas have announced auc-
tions for transit capacities through their pipelines to 
Austria demonstrates their wish to test future demand 
for shipping gas from the Nord Stream system to cen-
tral Europe and further.79 
When a revitalisation of TurkStream was floated 
in autumn 2016 this raised hopes in Slovakia, which 
would like to see Eastring connected to TurkStream 
and Slovakia become the hub for gas from the south-
east. Bratislava also believes that building TurkStream 
and Nord Stream 2 simultaneously would overstretch 
Gazprom financially. As such TurkStream would 
reduce the chances of Nord Stream 2.80 
Poland. In recent years Poland has undertaken con-
siderable efforts to improve its security of supply in 
the gas sector, building new links to the Czech Repub-
lic, increasing the capacity of existing interconnectors 
with Germany and creating the preconditions (tech-
nical or virtual, by offsetting without physical flow 
reversal) for using the Yamal transit pipeline in 
reverse-flow mode. According to Polish transmission 
operator Gaz-System this would allow up to 10 billion 
cubic metres annually to be imported from western 
Europe in case of need, corresponding to 90 percent 
of import requirements.81 The new Polish LNG termi-
nal at Świnoujście began operations in June 2016 after 
some delay. The facility has a capacity of 5 billion 
cubic metres annually (with an option to expand to 
7.5 billion). A contract with Qatar initially secures 
 
cians say “no” to Russian gas pipeline], HNonline.sk (online), 
5 January 2016, http://hn.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy-
117/slovenski-politici-odkazuju-nie-ruskemu-plynovodu-
1049976 (accessed 8 September 2016). 
79 Eustream chystá aukciu nových kapacít. Dôvodom je Nord 
Stream 2 [Eustream prepares auction of new capacities: The 
reason is Nord Stream 2], 1 March 2017, Energie.sk, http:// 
energia.dennikn.sk/dolezite/zemny-plyn-a-ropa/eustream-
chysta-aukciu-novych-kapacit-dovodom-je-nord-stream-
2/22974/. 
80 Erik Cziria, “Plynovod Turkov a Rusov berie Slovensko 
zatiaľ ako príležitosť” [Slovakia now regards Turkish/Russian 
pipeline as opportunity], Pravda (online), 23 October 2016, 
http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/408776-plynovod-
turkov-a-rusov-berie-slovensko-zatial-ako-prilezitost/ (accessed 
18 November 2016). 
81 Gaz-System, Nasze Inwestycje [Our investments], http://www. 
gaz-system.pl/nasze-inwestycje/ (accessed 8 September 2016). 
Poland 1.5 billion cubic metres annually. These meas-
ures generate a tangible improvement in Poland’s 
security of gas supply. 
Nord Stream 2 would not directly affect Polish energy 
security. But indirectly the pipeline project and the 
new transit capacities it creates could at some point 
call into question the Yamal route transporting Rus-
sian gas to western Europe (the agreement with Gaz-
prom secures use of the pipeline until 2019). Polish 
critics of Nord Stream 2 have expressed concern above 
all that cheap Russian gas supplied via Germany could 
pose a commercial threat to the Polish LNG terminal 
or domestic production, which meets about one-third 
of Polish needs.82 They also fear that Nord Stream 2 
could foil their efforts to establish and expand a new 
north-south energy corridor and make Poland into a 
hub routing gas (from Norway and its own LNG termi-
nal) to central Europe and other neighbouring coun-
tries, particularly Ukraine.83 Similar fears already exist 
in connection with Gazprom’s expanded utilisation 
of the OPAL pipeline, for which the European Commis-
sion recently granted its approval. The CEO of PGNiG 
has complained that this decision will cut Poland off 
from gas supplies from the east, but flood it with gas 
from the west. In early December 2016 the (German-
registered) PGNiG subsidiary PGNiG Supply and 
Trading submitted a complaint against the Commis-
sion’s ruling to the European Court of Justice.84 
Alongside such energy policy aspects, Poland also 
raises economic and logistical objections (as it did in 
connection with Nord Stream 1). Laying pipelines on 
the sea bed, the Poles say, would hamper the develop-
ment of shipping in Świnoujście and Szczecin, because 
maritime regulations would then prevent larger 
vessels docking there.85 
 
82 Budzanowski, “Demontaż unii energetycznej” (see note 70). 
83 “Zamiast Unii Energetycznej wojna na huby gazowe: 
‘Sprzeczne interesy Berlina i Warszawy’” [War over gas hubs 
rather than Energy Union: “Opposing interests in Berlin and 
Warsaw”], Portal Energetyka24 (online), 7 August 2016, http:// 
www.energetyka24.com/424730,zamiast-unii-energetycznej-
wojna-na-huby-gazowe-sprzeczne-interesy-berlina-i-warszawy 
(accessed 8 September 2016). 
84 “Woźniak: Jeśli Bruksela pomoże Gazpromowi ominąć 
Polskę, PGNiG pójdzie do sądu” [If Brussels helps Gazprom 
to bypass Poland, PGNiG will go to court], Biznes Alert (online), 
9 November 2016, http://biznesalert.pl/wozniak-jesli-bruksela-
pomoze-gazpromowi-ominac-polske-pgnig-pojdzie-sadu/ 
(accessed 18 November 2016). 
85 Unless they are buried, the pipelines will reduce the 
already relatively shallow depth of these ports and with it 
the maximum draught of vessels using them. Dissatisfied 
with a compromise reached before construction started, 
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Poland responds in two different ways to Nord 
Stream 2. Firstly, it seeks if not to prevent the project 
then at least to complicate or delay it using European 
and national instruments. For example, Poland ex-
pects the European Commission to thoroughly scruti-
nise the project. The Polish foreign minister called on 
the Danish government to deny its approval to the 
pipeline, which also passes through Danish territorial 
waters. The Polish competition authority UOKiK has 
formulated objections to the Nord Stream 2 consor-
tium’s application, which it sees as strengthening 
Gazprom’s already dominant market position. 
Secondly, Poland is increasingly seeking further 
diversification options, such as another potential 
expansion of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście or the 
construction of a floating LNG terminal in the Bay of 
Gdansk. Warsaw would also like to revive a project 
that was discussed several years ago, but then dropped: 
The offshore Baltic Pipe would connect Norwegian gas 
supplies via Denmark to Poland. Polish gas supplier 
PGNiG has in the past invested in Norwegian gas 
fields, and has now announced that it will prioritise 
the Baltic Pipe. Construction of a pipeline to the Nor-
wegian gas fields could, it said, be completed by 2022. 
If 7 billion cubic metres were transported annually, 
the project would break even. PGNiG currently sources 
about half a billion cubic metres annually from its 
Norwegian fields for the Polish market.86 It is con-
spicuous that interconnectors with Germany are rarely 
mentioned in the Polish diversification discussions. It 
is argued that such connections would merely import 
gas from Russia, just from the other direction. Above 
all, the Poles see a danger of gas from Germany plac-
 
Poland went to court in Germany to challenge the decisions. 
The administrative court in Hamburg rejected the complaint 
at the end of 2015; Andrzej Kublik, “Niemcy blokują rurą 
Nord Stream rozwój portu w Świnoujściu” [Germany blocks 
development of Świnoujście port through Nord Stream pipe-
line], Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 December 2015, http://wyborcza. 
biz/biznes/1,100896,19369299,niemcy-blokuja-rura-nord-
stream-rozwoj-portu-w-swinoujsciu.html (accessed 8 Septem-
ber 2016). 
86 “Kowalski: Baltic Pipe priorytetem. ‘Kluczowa kolejność 
powstawania gazociągów’” [Kowalski: Baltic Pipe is a priority: 
“Sequence of pipeline construction is crucial”], Energetyka 24 
(online), 16 May 2016, http://energetyka.defence24.pl/370388, 
kowalski-baltic-pipe-priorytetem-kluczowa-kolejnosc-
powstawania-gazociagow; “Będzie więcej ropy i gazu z PGNiG” 
[There will be more oil and gas from PGNiG], Wirtualny Nowy 
Przemysł (online), 25 October 2016, http://gazownictwo.wnp.pl/ 
bedzie-wiecej-ropy-i-gazu-z-pgnig,284184_1_0_0.html (both 
accessed 18 November 2016). 
ing commercial pressure on projects like the LNG 
terminal or the proposed Baltic Pipe.87 
Foreign policy objections to Nord Stream 2 are 
also discussed in Poland, at least as clearly as energy-
related and economic reservations. They are based on 
the idea that the gas trade, as the Polish Minister for 
European Affairs put it “has strategic consequences in 
our part of the continent”, and for example revenues 
from the energy business could flow via the Russian 
state budget directly into the defence sector.88 Nord 
Stream 2, prominent MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski said, 
represented a primarily political project with negative 
security and geopolitical implications for eastern 
Europe, after Nord Stream 1 had already allowed Mos-
cow to exert pressure on his part of Europe.89 Presi-
dent Andrzej Duda said that Nord Stream 2 would not 
improve Europe’s energy security and was therefore an 
“unnecessary and politically harmful” investment.90 
The Baltic states. The Baltic states also belong to the 
camp of firm critics of Nord Stream 2. Although they 
have no direct repercussions to fear from the pipeline 
plan (as none of them have transit pipelines on their 
territory) they are unsettled by the possible foreign 
policy implications and potential indirect conse-
 
87 Such concerns apply for example to the proposal to build 
a pipeline from Bernau (north of Berlin) to Szczecin, “Szanse 
I zagrożenia Korytarza Północnego: Eksperci o największym 
projekcie III RP” [Opportunities and risks of the northern 
corridor: Experts on the largest project of the third republic], 
Energetyka 24 (online), 17 May 2016, http://energetyka.defence24. 
pl/371268,szanse-i-zagrozenia-korytarza-polnocnego-eksperci-
o-najwiekszym-projekcie-iii-rp (accessed 8 September 2016). 
88 PAP, “Konrad Szymański, PiS: będziemy podnosić argu-
menty przeciw Nord Stream 2” [Konrad Szymański, PiS: We 
will present arguments against Nord Stream 2], Wirtualny 
Nowy Przemysł (online), 12 November 2015, http://gazownictwo. 
wnp.pl/konrad-szymanski-pis-bedziemy-podnosic-argumenty-
przeciw-nord-stream-2,261187_1_0_0.html (accessed 8 Sep-
tember 2016). 
89 “Saryusz-Wolski: Nord Stream 2 jest szkodliwy nie tylko 
energetycznie, ale przede wszystkim geopolitycznie” [Saryusz-
Wolski: Nord Stream 2 is harmful in geopolitical as well as 
energy policy terms], interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 24 
November 2015, Defence24 (online), http://energetyka.defence 
24.pl/274179,saryusz-wolski-nord-stream-2-jest-szkodliwy-nie-
tylko-energetycznie-ale-przede-wszystkim-geopolitycznie-
wywiad (accessed 8 September 2016). 
90 “Budowa Nord Stream 2. Duda: To politycznie szkodliwa 
decyzja” [Construction of Nord Stream 2: Duda: A politically 
harmful decision], money.pl (online), 3 November 2015, http:// 
www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/budowa-nord-
stream-2-duda-to-politycznie,2,0,1945602.html (accessed 8 
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quences for their diversification efforts. The prime 
ministers of the three Baltic states therefore demon-
strated public solidarity with Ukraine and pressed 
for thorough scrutiny of the project by the European 
Commission.91 Nord Stream 2, according to Lithuanian 
President Dalia Grybauskaite, represents yet another 
Russian attempt to divide the EU. Alluding to the 
proposed sale of a French amphibious assault ship 
to Russia (which was eventually stopped for foreign 
policy reasons), Grybauskaite called Nord Stream 2 a 
“Mistral test for the Energy Union”.92 In May 2016 the 
then Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Röivas called Nord 
Stream 2 a “a political project, which contradicts the 
energy policy of the European Union” and “a part of 
Russia’s foreign policy ambitions aimed at undermin-
ing of [sic] Europe’s unity.”93 
Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic the discussion 
is more differentiated. The country is also part of the 
broader Nord Stream 1 system, because gas from the 
OPAL pipeline is transported from Saxony to Bavaria 
via the Gazela pipeline, which passes through Czech 
territory. Nord Stream 2 therefore potentially offers 
the Czech Republic a chance to expand its position as 
a transit country, especially given the small volume of 
gas today using the route from Ukraine and Slovakia 
through the Czech Republic to the west. Moreover, the 
Czech Republic began diversifying in the 1990s, so its 
integration into the western European gas market is 
already well advanced. It is therefore fitting that the 
Czech government ultimately refrained from signing 
the joint letter from the east central European energy 
ministers. Altogether, Prague seeks to have the best 
of both worlds, reconciling interest in participating 
in Nord Stream 2 with a desire to uphold gas transit 
through Ukraine. The Czech Economic Affairs Minister 
has signalled that construction of Nord Stream 2 
 
91 In early November 2015 the three heads of government 
met with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and 
backed his criticism of Nord Stream, “Baltics Back Ukraine 
and Blast Nord Stream 2 Project”, LSM.lv (online), 5 November 
2015, http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/politics/baltics-back-
ukraine-and-blast-nord-stream-2-project.a153658/ (accessed 8 
September 2016). 
92 “Lithuania’s President: Nord Stream-2 Is Mistral Test for 
EU’s Energy Union”, Baltic Course (online), 22 January 2016, 
http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=115719 
(accessed 8 September 2016). 
93 “Estonia Considers Nord Stream 2 Project as Disruption 
of EU’s Unity”, Gas News (online), 30 May 2016, http://gasnews. 
today/2016/05/30/news/estonia-considers-nord-stream-2-
project-disruption-eus-unity.html (accessed 14 November 2016). 
should be compensated with an agreement promising 
Ukraine substantial ongoing transit volumes.94 
Hungary. Attitudes in Hungary are also graduated. 
Ending gas transport from Ukraine would also imply 
a reconfiguration of Hungary’s supply channels, as 
the country is currently connected to the Ukrainian 
network. Moreover, it is argued in Budapest that once 
Nord Stream 2 comes on stream Hungary can forget 
consolidating (still less expanding) its storage business 
for gas from the east. Hungarian critics also point out 
that Nord Stream 2 would compete with the South 
Stream project, in which Hungary has great interest. 
In this connection the Hungarians accused the Euro-
pean Commission of “double standards” (Hungarian 
Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó), having applied 
stricter legal standards to South Stream.95 Hungary’s 
foreign minister still sees opportunities to reinvigor-
ate South Stream, provided the Bulgarian government 
takes a more active stance.96 Hungarian politicians 
were initially reserved in their responses to the revival 
of TurkStream in autumn 2016, although the project 
is regarded as likely offering new opportunities con-
necting to a supply route from the south-east. 
Altogether in Hungary foreign policy arguments 
(such as effects on Ukraine) play a much smaller role 
than for example in Poland. Here it must also be re-
membered that Budapest pursues a pragmatic course 
towards Russia, and geostrategic considerations are 
comparably less prominent. The construction of a new 
interconnector to Slovakia also gives Hungary an addi-
tional entry point, ending its exclusive reliance on 
interconnectors with Ukraine and Austria. As such it 
will be able to compensate possible changes in supply 
flows from Russia. Completed in mid-2015, the pipe-
 
94 “Mládek: Nord Stream by se mohl rozšířit, kdyby padla 
dohoda o zachování ukrajinské cesty” [Mládek: Nord Stream 
could be expanded with agreement to keep Ukrainian route], 
Euractiv.cz (online), 7 January 2016, http://www.euractiv.cz/ 
energetika/clanek/mladek-nord-stream-by-se-mohl-rozsirit-
kdyby-padla-dohoda-o-zachovani-tranzitu-pres-ukrajinu-
013090#sthash.mlfxaF2D.dpuf (accessed 8 September 2016). 
95 Website of the Hungarian Government, “Közép-Európa 
érdeke a dél-európai gázfolyosó” [Central Europe’s interest in 
southern European gas corridor], 12 November 2015, http:// 
www.kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/ 
hirek/kozep-europa-erdeke-a-del-europai-gazfolyoso (accessed 
12 November 2015). 
96 A bolgár választásoktól is függ a magyar gázellátás? 
[Hungarian gas supply also depends on Bulgarian elections], 
Portfolio, 1 March 2017, http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/ 
a_bolgar_valasztasoktol_is_fugg_a_magyar_gazellatas.244805.
html. 
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line has a capacity of 4.5 billion cubic metres annually 
for transporting gas to Hungary, which could come 
through the Nord Stream 2 system (via Czech Republic 
and Slovakia).97 At their meeting in February 2017 
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Russia’s 
President Vladimir Putin declared that Hungary might 
receive gas deliveries from Russia via the Nord Stream 
system. 
Bulgaria. In the end, like the Czech Republic, Bulgaria 
decided not to sign the joint letter from the east cen-
tral European energy ministers. Sofia is still (or again) 
concentrating on reviving the South Stream project 
(possibly in modified form under a new name), espe-
cially given that work on it had already begun. The 
Bulgarian prime minister emphasised just at the end 
of 2015 that his country was interested in becoming 
a Balkan gas hub, mainly distributing Russian gas, 
alongside deliveries from Azerbaijan and domestic 
production.98 Critical observers suspect that Gazprom 
was involved in the conflict between state energy com-
panies and private-sector supplier Overgas that broke 
out at the end of 2015. Elimination of the only com-
petition to the state-controlled operators gave Sofia 
incentives to come to an arrangement with Gaz-
prom.99 Gazprom is probably speculating that regu-
latory exemptions for Nord Stream 2 will create a 
precedent for a southern route, and that the chances 
for South Stream could therefore improve again. If 
transit via Ukraine ceased completely, Bulgaria would 
certainly have to create infrastructure from scratch to 
receive gas from Russia via a different route. Currently 
Bulgaria’s gas arrives through Romania. Similar diffi-
 
97 Moreover it would also be possible to import from Poland 
LNG via the north-south corridor and this link; see “Új irány-
ból hoznának orosz gázt Magyarországra” [Russian gas could 
come to Hungary from a new direction], Világgazdaság (on-
line), 18 August 2016, http://www.vg.hu/vallalatok/energia/  
uj-iranybol-hoznanak-orosz-gazt-magyarorszagra-474246; 
“Slovensko-maďarský plynovod ožil” [Slovak-Hungarian pipe-
line revived], V energetike (online), 30 March 2016, http:// 
venergetike.sk/slovensko-madarsky-plynovod-ozil/ (accessed 
jeweils am 18 November 2016). 
98 Georgi Gotev, “Borissov: I Told Merkel Bulgaria Plans 
Pipeline Similar to Nord Stream 2”, EurActiv.com (online), 
17 December 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/ 
borissov-i-told-merkel-bulgaria-plans-pipeline-similar-nord-
stream-2-320564 (accessed 8 September 2016). 
99 “Bulgaria’s Overgas ‘Warned EU’ Russia Might Seek to 
Renew South Stream Business Energy”, novinite.com (online), 
7 January 2016, http://www.novinite.com/articles/172530/ 
Bulgaria%27s+Overgas+%27Warned+EU%27+Russia+Might+ 
Seek+to+Renew+South+Stream (accessed 8 September 2016). 
culties would arise for a number of non-EU states in 
the Western Balkans, especially for Macedonia.100 
Romania. Romania, finally, is also part of the group 
critical of Nord Stream. On account of its own sub-
stantial domestic reserves, Romania imports relatively 
small amounts of Russian gas. Following a steady 
decline in consumption, domestic production (roughly 
10 billion cubic metres annually) already covers more 
than 90 percent of Romanian demand.101 So Bucha-
rest’s rejection of Nord Stream 2 is likely motivated 
primarily by foreign policy: support for Ukraine and 
a traditional scepticism towards Russia. In terms of 
energy policy, Nord Stream 2 is relevant in relation to 
potential repercussions for planned pipeline projects 
involving Romanian firms. Thus it matters to Romania 
whether Nord Stream 2 has positive effects on the 
BRUA project favoured by Romanian Transgaz (con-
necting Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria and 
for possible transport of gas from the south-east or the 
Black Sea),102 or tends to favour the Slovak Eastring 
project. 
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Summary and Outlook 
 
Summing up the debates about Nord Stream 2, the 
following aspects are central: The objective of Nord 
Stream 2 is to bypass Ukraine and deliver gas directly 
to the north-west European markets. The geopolitical 
and economic interests of Gazprom and the Kremlin 
are behind the project. The pipeline through the Baltic 
Sea brings benefits to the German gas market and 
other large adjacent markets, above all if the transit 
connection through Ukraine is preserved as a flexibil-
ity option. Nord Stream 2 creates a direct, efficient, 
modern connection to the major gas fields of Western 
Siberia. So the medium term economic benefits are 
obvious for north-western Europe. To what extent, 
however, Nord Stream 2 volumes will be transported 
on from Baumgarten to Italy and south east Europe is 
unclear. The south-east European member states and 
the Balkans will either have to pursue alternative 
diversification projects or rely on Turk Stream or a 
reincarnation of South Stream and continuing use 
of the pipelines through Ukraine. 
The repercussions of Nord Stream 2 extend far 
beyond energy relations. Despite (or precisely because 
of) the emerging compromises to end protracted dis-
putes between Gazprom and the Commission, the 
pipeline project encounters great reservations. It is 
associated with high political costs, regardless whether 
it is completed rapidly, late or never. The differences 
in interests and perceptions already have consequences 
for relations between EU member states, between the 
EU and Russia, and between individual member states 
and Russia. Nord Stream 2 exposes the energy policy – 
and more broadly internal market and foreign policy – 
dilemmas faced by the EU. 
Developing the Energy Union. Critical observers and 
many EU member states believe that the Nord Stream 
2 plan contradicts the objectives of diversification and 
security of supply. The project therefore needs to be 
subjected to a qualitative political review orientated 
in particular on the paradigms of “solidarity and 
trust” upon which the Energy Union was founded. 
However, it is difficult to estimate the costs and ben-
efits for individual member states on the basis of this 
approach: firstly, because a clear prioritisation be-
tween target categories (security of supply, compe-
tition, sustainability) is lacking and there is little 
consensus within the Union over the future develop-
ment of the Energy Union; secondly, because the scope 
of energy solidarity within the EU is unclear, in other 
words how massive the potential negative effects on 
one or more member states have to be before firms 
and/or one or more other member states have to can-
cel a project. The beneficiaries of a project like Nord 
Stream 2 will turn the argument on its head, playing 
down potential drawbacks for other member states 
and arguing that preventing the project on political 
grounds would show a lack of solidarity by denying 
commercial and energy policy benefits. 
In the EU as a collective the question of solidarity 
and cooperation in developing the Energy Union is 
decisive. That also means that one project cannot 
decide the fate of the Energy Union, which after all 
consists of five dimensions.103 Very different prioritisa-
tions of these five dimensions are found within the 
EU-28 and the Union’s organs. And that opens up pos-
sibilities for a reconciliation of interests. 
State and market paradigms. Nord Stream 2 illustrates 
that the rivalry between market and state in the energy 
sector in the EU has yet to be resolved. This is why the 
criticism that Nord Stream 2 is driving a wedge into 
the EU’s gas market is misleading. The gas market is 
already divided over the implementation of market 
reforms. If anything, Nord Stream 1 has contributed 
to expanding spot market transactions into eastern 
Europe. However, there are also growing tensions 
between the EU member states and the Commission 
over the distribution of powers in this area of policy. 
While Germany supports and propagates a market 
governed purely by commercial considerations, a 
number of neighbouring countries see growing trends 
towards renationalisation and state influence. So in 
the EU there is a need both to contain disintegrative 
tendencies and to balance out the roles and responsi-
bilities between the Commission, the member states 
and companies. 
Commission as political actor? In the scope of develop-
ing the Energy Union, the Commission is increasingly 
 
103 This argument is also followed by Severin Fischer, Nord 
Stream 2: Trust in Europe, CSS Policy Perspectives 4/4 (Zurich: 
Center for Security Studies [CSS], March 2016). 
Summary and Outlook 
SWP Berlin 
Nord Stream 2 
March 2017 
 
 
 
36 
seeking to play a more political role. As the discus-
sions over the application of internal market regula-
tion to Nord Stream 2 demonstrate, there are strong 
tendencies to view energy relation through the geo-
political lens. The most effective lever at its disposal is 
regulation. But instrumentalising regulation in order 
to enforce (geo)political interests is a dangerous road. 
Recourse to legalistic arguments is always problematic, 
and inappropriate in the case of a project whose impli-
cations extend far beyond the energy aspects. Observ-
ing its own principles and upholding generally appli-
cable frameworks (even where there are unintended 
consequences) is a question of the credibility of the 
EU and a requirement for rule-based dealings between 
companies, states and the Commission. Moreover, the 
freedom to do business in a competitive market is a 
fundamental principle that should not be lightly 
sacrificed to geopolitical and strategic interests. 
Political costs and relations with Russia. Strategically 
and politically it is an important question whether the 
pipeline project ultimately places Germany and the 
EU at the mercy of the Russian gas monopoly, which 
could lead directly to political vulnerability.104 The 
project certainly reinforces Gazprom’s position in the 
German market, supplies it with another instrument 
with which to optimise its market strategy, and could 
potentially inhibit the appetite of other market par-
ticipants to invest in diversification projects. Yet, this 
is part of market power play and profit maximisation 
strategies and as such (a common) issue for competi-
tion and antitrust control. On the one side, this calls 
for action by the German competition authorities. On 
the other, Germany is part of the integrated north-
west European gas market and possesses a series of 
options for sourcing gas elsewhere. 
Regardless of the current situation of well-supplied 
gas markets, political perceptions also play a role. 
Within the EU there are very different political stances 
on energy trade with Russia. Whereas the central east-
ern European states focus on dependency and vulner-
ability, Germany has for decades shaped its relations 
under the paradigms of rapprochement, change and 
interdependency. This approach implies a realisation 
that economic interrelations can contribute to mak-
ing political actions more predictable by increasing 
the costs of worsening the relationship. Reducing the 
density of economic ties and interactions is not per-
ceived as an appropriate response to a sensitive 
 
104 The authors are grateful to Heiko Lohmann for pinpoint-
ing this aspect in comments and discussions. 
security situation. This is the basis of the dual strategy 
of deterrence and cooperation pursued by German for-
eign policy since the crisis over Ukraine. 
In terms of the general state of relations between 
the EU and Russia, there are good grounds to build on 
the economic dimension of relations and maintain 
the energy trade as a major channel of cooperation. In 
times of growing divergence and strained relations, 
economic exchange offers added value. At the same 
time, the Russian gas market has witnessed remark-
able reforms in recent years. Gazprom is increasingly 
prepared to follow the rules in the EU. It will not be 
possible to amplify that momentum of economic 
rationality if the EU itself insists on purely geopolitical 
stances. Although positive effects for other policy 
areas cannot be expected in the current situation, 
there is certainly a danger of negative spill-over effects 
if conflicts occur over gas. There is, however, also 
greater scope for coordination of interests, because 
Gazprom and other Russian gas suppliers will con-
tinue to need the European market. 
So at the same time Nord Stream 2 sends signals 
that extend beyond economic relations. If it is realised, 
that would send Russia a visible message that a 
deepening of cooperation with the EU and/or eco-
nomic entities from the EU is possible and desirable, 
and that essentially economic projects will not be 
obstructed by member states’ interests, foreign policy 
calculations or EU law. That fundamental message 
could confirm to Russia that there is no powerful veto 
within the EU against vital energy projects, regardless 
whether the objections are motivated commercially 
or by foreign policy. Whether this interpretation gains 
traction in Russia will depend at the same time on 
how the modalities of implementation turn out in the 
end: what terms and conditions are ultimately placed 
upon the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline 
and its onward connections. 
If Nord Stream 2 is not built for the time being on 
account of resistance within the EU, Gazprom will be 
“forced” to continue to fulfil its contracts with Euro-
pean customers via Ukraine, because these contracts 
are overwhelmingly long-term with fixed volumes 
and delivery dates. In the medium term Russia could 
attempt to further discredit Ukraine as an unreliable 
transit country and use destabilisation to call into 
question that route’s reliability. 
On the other hand, Russia would regard realisation 
of Nord Stream 2 as a political success in multiple 
respects. Firstly, because it would have achieved an im-
portant foreign policy objective in the “near abroad”; 
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secondly, because it would demonstrate that Russia 
is able – despite European energy policy and Energy 
Union – to exploit opportunities in the system to 
secure special interests and cooperation; and thirdly 
because Russia would have demonstrated that it is 
possible to realise a major economic cooperation 
project with European actors even in difficult times. 
Altogether, therefore Russia, would also regard the 
construction of Nord Stream 2 as a step towards con-
solidating relations with the EU (that are deadlocked 
or negative in other areas). So here too, conflicts 
of goals arise for Brussels and the member states, 
because Nord Stream 2 would send Russia a message 
that even a massive conflict need not necessarily 
preclude cooperation in key areas. 
Ukraine: borderland, bridge or part of the European mar-
ket? The European Commission and numerous mem-
ber states wish to maintain transit through Ukraine.105 
If gas transit from Russia through Ukraine to central 
and south-eastern Europe ceases, the foreign policy 
and security consequences for Kiev will be significant. 
Kiev will lose its “transit power” vis-à-vis Russia and 
already existing asymmetries will shift in Moscow’s 
favour. So what is at stake for Ukraine is the preser-
vation of leverage – which in view of the geopolitical 
dimension of the energy trade must be regarded as 
problematic from the importers’ perspective. 
In fact all sides to this discussion – Ukraine, Euro-
pean Union and Russia – must actually have an inter-
est in significant volumes continuing to be transported 
through Ukraine, simply for reasons of diversification. 
Compartmentalising the transport question, isolating 
it from the geopolitical situation, is thus technically 
and economically rational. But that presupposes that 
all parties demonstrate a political will to act rationally 
and objectively. Developments in the European gas 
market currently appear headed for division and regu-
latory/technical/planning dislocation, as there is a lack 
of perspective-seeking dialogue about shared rules 
between the EU/Energy Community and Russia/Eura-
sian Economic Union. It should not be forgotten that 
a sustainable solution for the Ukrainian gas transit 
must involve both Russia and Ukraine. 
Thinking it from the Ukrainian point of view casts 
a very clear light on the broader context of the Nord 
 
105 The Commission “remains of the opinion that Ukraine 
is a credible partner for the transit of Russian natural gas and 
that it would be in the interests of all sides for Ukraine to 
remain a transit state”, response of 21 January 2016 from 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete to a written question 
from MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski. Author’s archive. 
Stream 2 project. Under strategic/political aspects the 
first question is whether it will destabilise Ukraine.106 
The loss of important transit revenues can be partly 
compensated by cheaper gas prices, while security 
of supply has been transformed by the west-east flow 
reversal options. Ukraine’s future is not going to be 
determined by retention or loss of its transit role, but 
by deep reforms (in the area of energy) and a restruc-
turing of the energy system. Above all in view of the 
urgently-needed, long-postponed but now advancing 
energy market reforms, there is good reason to believe 
that gas transit will not have a decisive bearing on the 
country’s economic and energy situation (nor on its 
political survival). What is important is the approach 
pursued by the EU, namely to encourage sweeping 
reforms and to improve the connectivity of Ukraine’s 
energy markets with those of the Western Balkan 
states and Moldova, and above all with the EU’s in-
ternal market. 
A further problem looms for the trilateral talks in 
which representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the EU 
have met regularly since the beginning of the crisis: 
since summer 2014 Russia and Ukraine have been 
embroiled in dispute settlement cases over supply and 
transit contracts concluded in the form of international 
treaties.107 A ruling from the Stockholm Arbitration 
Institute is not expected before spring 2017. The 
Ukrainian gas supplier Naftohaz complains that the 
price is unfairly high; Gazprom points to the price 
formula and purchasing duty laid out in the 2009 con-
tract.108 In the meantime further cases are pending. 
Altogether the sums involved on the Ukrainian side 
amount to roughly $10 billion. Russia’s demands 
could easily be of the same order of magnitude. It is 
doubtful whether these sums will be paid from one 
side to the other, quite regardless of the outcome. 
That would deepen rather than smooth the conflicts 
between Russia and Ukraine. The EU and Germany 
should therefore work towards political containment 
of open and latent disputes. 
Gas development region south-eastern Europe. Changes 
affecting the Ukrainian transit corridor potentially 
have consequences for the south-eastern European EU 
member states, for the Balkan members of the Energy 
 
106 The authors are grateful to Heiko Lohmann for raising 
this aspect in comments and discussions. 
107 Grätz and Westphal, Ende gut, alles gut? (see note 47). 
108 Helmut Steuer, “Das Schweigen der Schlichter im Gas-
streit”, Die Welt, 14 July 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/ 
ausland/article130133100/Das-Schweigen-der-Schlichter-im-
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Community, and for Turkey (European part and Istan-
bul). While Nord Stream 2 is most important for the 
north-west European gas markets, the markets in 
south-eastern Europe and the Balkans depend on the 
development of regional interconnectors and above all 
the fate of the TurkStream and South Stream import 
projects discussed above. Here the EU and the Energy 
Community are faced with a strategic dilemma over 
network development. From the Russian perspective it 
would be tactically wise to keep all options open – also 
but not solely on account of the geopolitical volatility. 
For the countries in the region that heightens the un-
certainties of network development, hampering alter-
native projects from the planning state onward, but 
also inhibits intra-European networking between the 
EU and the Energy Community. 
Recommendations for Germany and 
the European Union 
Even though Germany adheres to its line that Nord 
Stream 2 is a strictly commercial and economically 
prudent venture, Berlin still has to address its foreign 
policy reverberations. 
European and foreign policy costs must be expected 
in particular where countries that feel disadvantaged 
or even harmed by Nord Stream 2 seek counter-strat-
egies and may even question their partnership with 
Germany in a broader context. Reducing these effects 
demands clear messaging and visible steps to protect 
or restore trust. This applies most strongly in relation 
to certain central eastern European states such as 
Poland and Slovakia. The fields most in need of such 
confidence-building steps are energy policy (bilateral 
and European) and foreign, Russia and neighbourhood 
policy. The corresponding measures need to be ini-
tiated via Brussels in the scope of the Energy Union, 
but backed up by German European and energy 
policy. This demands a high level of energy diplomacy. 
The aim must be to accommodate Nord Stream 2 with-
in the principles of European energy policy and the 
goals of the Energy Union, and to make progress with 
the integration of the internal market. That means 
above all the following: 
 It is in Germany’s interest to play an active part 
in shaping European energy policy and the Energy 
Union. Germany needs to avoid being perceived as 
the spoiler of trust and solidarity in a central field 
of European policy on account of its line on Nord 
Stream 2. To that extent Germany’s scepticism over 
regional cooperation in the discussions over the 
new Regulation on security of gas supply sends a 
misleading and unfortunately timed message, even 
if there are good reasons behind its criticisms at the 
granular level. Berlin should make it clear that it is 
fundamentally positive towards the idea of regional 
mechanisms for ensuring security of gas supply. 
 Germany is interested in advancing integration 
in the gas market on its own account, and should 
therefore work to counteract divisive tendencies 
that the project might create. It is already apparent 
that Nord Stream 2 will open new rifts, because cer-
tain states see grounds to accelerate their diversifi-
cation efforts or expedite regional counter-meas-
ures, for example to protect themselves against an 
influx of cheap Russian gas that they fear would 
thwart their diversification strategies. In order to 
counteract such developments, bilateral and regional 
technical, operational and regulatory cooperation 
need to be stepped up along the supply corridors. 
The key to this is implementing the third internal 
market package in central eastern and south-east-
ern Europe and establishing functioning competi-
tion in the region, including through changes in 
the tariff system and facilitating cross-border flows. 
 Germany should signalise fundamental interest in 
maintaining a diversity of gas import routes from 
Russia, in other words the coexistence of Nord 
Stream (1 and 2), Yamal and the Ukraine corridor. 
It is becoming clear that troubles will continue to 
afflict the Ukrainian corridor, and require conflict 
management and a mediating role on the part of 
the EU Commission. Tensions will arise at least in 
connection with the transition from the transit 
contract of 2009 to the regulatory regime of the 
third internal market package, and in the context 
of the three arbitration cases where enormous sums 
are at stake and no legal solution can be expected. 
Addressing these conflicts will also open up possi-
bilities for compromise, for example in defining 
transitional periods for implementing new tariffs 
or in the form of improvements in the transparency 
of tariff-setting after 2019. For the modernisation 
and reorientation of the Ukrainian pipeline net-
work it is absolutely decisive to have clarity about 
the volumes to be transported and the transit tariffs 
to be applied. And beyond this, a “business model” 
for the pipeline operators needs to be established. 
All involved should see an interest in preserving 
this flexibility option. 
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 Energy talks with Russia should concentrate on con-
structive outcomes. The emergence of possible solu-
tions for OPAL and the anti-trust case in autumn 
2016 represents an important step forward. One ele-
ment of a comprehensive package could be to devel-
op the central eastern and south-east European gas 
markets and network planning initially in the Cen-
tral Eastern and South Eastern Gas Connectivity 
Forum – ideally including Russia and Turkey. Here 
a shared energy vision for the Black Sea region and 
the eastern Adriatic needs to be sought. That pre-
supposes a technical/regulatory dialogue, as well as 
a reconciliation of interests: whereas Russia wants 
Nord Stream 2, the EU would like to expand its gas 
imports from Azerbaijan (and in the longer term 
Turkmenistan). 
 Germany and the Visegrád countries could set up a 
task force on energy and security of supply (similar 
to the pentalateral forum for electricity), to dis-
cuss questions such as improving energy solidarity 
between Germany and these neighbouring coun-
tries, for example in the gas sector between Ger-
many, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. This 
format could also be used to explore to what extent 
Slovakia could become a new transit country for 
transporting gas to Ukraine or south-eastern Eu-
rope. A dialogue in a multilateral setting might 
demonstrate that differences of interest also exist 
between the central eastern European countries 
(as for example the Czech Republic’s stance on Nord 
Stream 2 already demonstrated). 
 If the construction or operation of Nord Stream 2 
are delayed or the pipeline is put on ice because of 
the final ruling on the OPAL pipeline and a com-
promise acceptable to Gazprom in the anti-trust 
case, that would represent only a strategic pause 
and not the end of the search for a lasting solution 
to the problem of east-west gas transit into the 
EU. Gazprom and Moscow will continue to ques-
tion Ukraine’s status as a transit corridor. The 
TurkStream project will continue to ensure move-
ment and agitation there. At the same time, the 
worries of the central eastern European EU states 
have by no means been dispelled. Their initial 
responses to the OPAL ruling suggest that they fear 
that the Commission’s settlement with Gazprom 
will at least lead to more effective utilisation of 
Nord Stream 1, which would face them with quan-
titatively smaller but qualitatively similar effects 
to Nord Stream 2, for example in connection with 
Russian gas supplies to their domestic markets. All 
in all, this could foster scepticism towards the Euro-
pean Commission, which has in the past been seen 
as an important ally in the conflict with Gazprom. 
So if Nord Stream 2 were to be suspended – even 
temporarily – there would be a need to intensify the 
energy dialogue between the Commission and rele-
vant member states and between these member 
states and Germany. If these countries maintain 
their stance that Nord Stream 2 or a Nord Stream 2 
“exit deal” would violate the fundamental princi-
ples of European energy policy or the Energy Union, 
they will feel justified in hardening their position 
or interpreting principles in their own interests 
elsewhere (from energy to climate policy). 
Abbreviations 
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
CEER Council of European Energy Regulators 
CEGH Central European Gas Hub 
ENTSOG European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Gas 
EUGAL European gas pipeline link  
(Europäische Gas-Anbindungsleitung) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
LNG Liquefied natural gas 
NC CAM Network Code Capacity Allocation Mechanisms 
NEL Nordeuropäische Erdgasleitung  
(northern European natural gas pipeline) 
OMV Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung (oil company) 
OPAL Baltic Sea Pipeline Link  
(Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung) 
PGNiG Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo  
(Polish oil and gas company) 
RCEPR Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research (Budapest) 
REKK Regionális Energiagazdasági Kutatóközpont 
(Budapest) (Regional Centre for Energy Policy 
Research; RCEPR) 
RWE Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG 
(German power company) 
SPP Slovenský plynárenský priemysel, a.s.  
(Slovak gas supplier) 
UOKiK Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów  
(Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, 
Poland) 
